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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
RICHARD FRANKLIN NORRIS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20030817-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from a conviction and sentence entered on pleas of guilty to two 
charges of attempted communications fraud, both class A misdemeanors, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §76-10-1801 (1999) (R. 1826-28) (in Addendum A). This Court has jurisdiction 
of this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
ISSUE 1: Is Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801, otherwise known as the communications 
fraud statute, unconstitutionally overbroad or unconstitutionally vague? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law. 
Grand County v. Emery County, 52 P.3d 1148, 1151 (Utah 2002). A statute is presumed 
constitutional such that any reasonable doubts are resolved in favor of its constitutionality. 
Id.; State v. Lopes, 1999 XJT 24, ^6, 980?.2d 191. 
ISSUE 2: Did the trial court have subject matter jurisdiction over this felony case 
where: 
A. during the six weeks between issuance and recall of a remittitur, the court accepted 
for filing a felony information involving the same parties and some of the same conduct at 
issue in the misdemeanor appeal, but stayed the matter pending completion of the appeal? 
B. all prior charges filed in the district court had been dismissed without prejudice, 
and the district court made no ruling that conflicted with the appellate courts' exercise of 
their jurisdiction over the misdemeanor appeal? 
C. the prosecution's multiple attempts to file a single viable prosecution against 
defendant was accomplished in good faith and under circumstances evincing no potentially 
abusive practices or vindictive motivation? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "The determination of whether a court has subject 
matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which [this Court] review[s] for correctness, 
according no deference to the district court's determination." Beaver v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 
UT 81, Tf 8, 31 P.3d 1147. Questions regarding the scope of judical authority appear to be 
questions of law, reviewed for correctness. See id.; Oliphantv. Estate ofBrunetti, 2002 UT 
App375,t7,64P.3d587. 
2 
ISSUE 3: Should this Court address defendant's claims of plain error and ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel where he does not identify any particular unpreserved claims to 
which these doctrines should be applied and does not provide sufficient argument to establish 
either obviousness or deficient performance? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: When appellant fails to advance an argument in 
compliance with rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court should decline 
to reach the claim. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional and statutory provisions are relevant to determination of 
the issues in this appeal and are appended hereto in Addendum A: 
United States Constitution, Amendment V; 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, § 1; 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, §§ 7 and 15; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
1. The criminal conduct giving rise to these proceedings occurred from March 
through June, 1993 (R. 0165). 
!Because defendant's challenges largely involve procedural aspects of this case, 
and the procedural history is convoluted, it is presented in numbered, chronological 
paragraphs to aid the reader. 
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2. The West Valley City attorney initially charged defendant in December 1994 with 
four misdemeanor counts of communications fraud in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
1801(1) in the Third Circuit Court, West Valley Department (R. 0165, 0384, 0621-22). 
3. In February 1996, on defendant's motion to quash the misdemeanor charges, the 
circuit court judge dismissed the charges on the ground that the aggregate of the four counts 
exceeded the circuit court's jurisdictional limit of $1,000 (R. 0165, 0387-88, 0678-83). 
4. The West Valley City Attorney appealed the dismissal to the Utah Court of 
Appeals (R. 0165, 0388, 0700-08). 
5. In October 1996, the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office ["DA's office"] charged 
defendant in the Third District Court with eleven felony counts of communications fraud (R. 
0165,0176,0232,0392,0730-35). 
6. Defendant moved to quash the felony charges because the West Valley appeal was 
still pending (R. 0166, 0393-94, 0740). Judge Palmer granted the motion and dismissed the 
charges without prejudice on December 10, 1996, noting that the State could refile the 
charges upon dismissal of the misdemeanor appeal (R. 0166, 0232, 0394, 0740). 
7. The DA's office immediately sought to dismiss the appeal (R. 0201-02, 0394, 
0742). Defendant actively opposed the dismissal because of the prosecutor's intent to file 
felony charges, but the appellate court dismissed the appeal on March 26, 1997 (R. 0785, 
0788-89). 
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8. In early April, 1997, ten of the felony charges were re-filed on the belief that the 
misdemeanor appeal had been dismissed (R. 1-6).2 
9. Defendant, through counsel, moved to dismiss the felony charges on April 10, 
1997, arguing that the necessary remittitur had not issued (R. 23-48). Judge Dever granted 
defendant's motion and again dismissed the charges without prejudice (R. 1860: 27) (in 
Addendum B). 
10. Defendant, pro se9 sought dismissal of the charges with prejudice two weeks later 
(R. 68-80). He did not file supplemental documents to support his motion until three months 
later (R. 84-103). 
11. The remittitur issued May 13, 1997 (R. 82), and the DA's office refiled twenty 
felony communications fraud charges on May 15, 1997 (R. 2-11). In the meantime, 
defendant asked the Court of Appeals to reconsider the dismissal of the appeal (R. 790,1066-
67). Defendant also filed a petition for writ of certiorari (R. 1067), then filed an 
extraordinary writ to recall the remittitur because it issued prior to expiration of the time for 
filing the petition for writ of certiorari (R. 210, 214, 791-92, 796, 1066-67). 
12. At the same time, defendant filed in the trial court on May 20, 1997, a motion to 
strike the most recent information (R. 35-80; R. 1864:4). 
2The record consists largely of pleadings and transcripts from district court case 
no. 971008355, from which this appeal arises. There is also a pleading file and transcript 
from the immediately preceding case, no. 971005698. Few citations to the latter case are 
necessary and will be indicated in this brief in bold typeface. 
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13. Defendant's request for an extraordinary writ prompted the Utah Supreme Court 
to order recall of the remittitur on June 26, 1997 (R. 0398, 0792, 0795). The Court of 
Appeals recalled its remittitur by order dated June 30,1997, and defendant sought certiorari 
review of the dismissal of the original appeal in both the Utah Supreme Court and the United 
States Supreme Court (R. 0398-99, 0792, 0795). Both courts denied certiorari review, and 
the case was again remitted to the trial court on October 30,1998 (R. 0166-67, 0216, 0233, 
0399,0406,0792-93,0831). 
14. While pursuing certiorari review of the appeal, defendant, through counsel, again 
sought dismissal of the felony charges in the trial court on September 26, 1997 (R. 109). 
15. On November 19, 1997, after several additional filings and appearances by 
defendant in the trial court, and while the certiorari proceedings were under way, Judge 
Dever denied defendant's motions to dismiss with prejudice, denied his motion to strike the 
information, and declared that he would entertain no further hearings, motions or argument 
until the misdemeanor appeal was remitted (R. 1864: 1-4; 1865) (in Addendum B). 
16. After issuance of the final remittitur, Judge Dever again denied the motion on 
December 4, 1998, and set the case for preliminary hearing (R. 153) (in Addendum B).3 
17. The preliminary hearing occurred February 3 and 26,1999 (R. 1866,1867). The 
State dismissed eight of the twenty charges when four victims did not appear at the 
3Judge Dever signed the order on February 2, 1999 (R. 0402, 1008), and defendant 
unsuccessfully attempted to appeal that decision and to obtain certiorari review in the 
Utah Supreme Court (R. 0402-03, 1010-14, 1016). 
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preliminary hearing (R. 0151; R. 1868: 27). Defendant was bound over on the remaining 
twelve charges (R. 1868: 36-37). 
18. On February 23, 1999, defendant moved to dismiss the charges, claiming 
expiration of the statute of limitations (R. 159-217). 
19. On April 16, 1999, the State filed an amended information accurately reflecting 
the remaining twelve felony counts of communications fraud (R. 218-23) (information 
attached in Addendum C). 
20. By order filed June 8,1999, Judge Palmer denied defendant's motion to dismiss, 
finding no statute of limitations violation (R. 0232-33). 
21. The Public Defender Association, which had been representing defendant, 
withdrew, and Gregory G. Skordas was appointed to represent defendant (R. 240-45). 
22. Between September 28 and October 29,1999, defendant, through counsel, sought 
and obtained an extension of time to file several motions, which he subsequently filed, both 
pro se and through counsel (R. 264-68, 270-72, 273-82, 305-17, 319-27, 328-52). 
23. At an October 21 motion hearing, the trial court granted defendant's supplemental 
discovery request and denied three of defendant's other motions (1873:45-51,69-70; 80-84). 
24. Two days prior to trial, on November 15, 1999, defendant filed a motion to 
reconsider his request for substitute counsel and his motion to stay the proceedings (R. 364-
1123). 
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25. Defendant appeared for trial on November 17,1999 (R. 1536:2). Defendant was 
accompanied by his appointed counsel as well as by an attorney defendant had retained to 
represent him at trial (R. 1536: 12). After hearing argument, the court denied defendant's 
motion to reconsider, his request for a stay, and his motion for appoiintment of paid counsel 
(R. 1536: 2-10, 12-22, 24). The court also denied defendant's earlier motion for a bill of 
particulars, expressly noting that defendant waited too long before filing it then failed to seek 
compliance until the day set for trial (R. 1536: 22). 
26. The court recessed after disposing of the pre-trial matters. When it reconvened, 
defendant entered conditional guilty pleas to counts I and III of the amended information (R. 
1536: 25-26, 53-54). The remaining counts were dismissed. 
27. Two weeks later, on December 1, 1999, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty 
pleas and again requested appointment of counsel (R. 1203-79). He supplemented that 
motion fourteen days later (R. 1280-1333). 
28. On December 20, 1999, defendant filed a petition for extraordinary writ, asking 
for appointment of substitute counsel for his attempt to withdraw his pleas (R. 1457-76). 
This Court denied the writ as frivolous on its face (R. 1477). 
29. On January 3,2000, defendant was sentenced to zero-to-five years on each of the 
two felony counts, with the sentences to run consecutively (R. 1481-88). 
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30. The same day, defendant sought a certificate of probable cause (R. 1489-95). On 
February 14, 2000, the trial court denied both the application for a certificate of probable 
cause and the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas (R. 1519-21). 
31. Defendant timely appealed his conviction and sentence, and this Court reversed 
and remanded the case based on possible confusion which appeared to exist surrounding 
defendant's ability to raise a vindictive prosecution claim on appeal (R. 1592-97) (ruling in 
Addendum D). 
32. On remand, defendant withdrew his guilty pleas, and the matter was set for a 
seven-day trial (R. 1614-16). 
33. Defendant again filed a series of motions (R. 1639-41,1643-48,1649-1781). The 
trial court granted defendant additional time, and the State responded to each motion (R. 
1633-34,1782-1804). Thereafter, the trial court denied the motion to recall the warrant and 
vacate bail (R. 1809). Several motions were not ruled on because of the subsequent entry of 
defendant's pleas. 
34. On September 8,2003, defendant entered conditional guilty pleas to two charges 
of attempted communications fraud, both class A misdemeanors, reserving for appeal the 
"narrow issues of the constitutionality of the charging statute and jurisdictional issues 
previously raised with the Court and presently the subject of the appeal from judgment 
in the Fourth District Court case, which is presently on appeal" (R. 1814-22; 1827-28).4 
4Defendant does not challenge the validity of his guilty plea on appeal. 
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The trial court conducted a rule 11 colloquy, and defendant executed his supporting affidavit 
(R. 1814-22; R. 1883: 2-18) (affidavit in Addendum E). 
35. Defendant was sentenced the same day to two terms of one year in jail, received 
credit for time served and was released (R. 1823-26, 1827-28). 
36. Defendant timely appealed to this Court (R. 1829-30). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS5 
Defendant purported to operate a business that sold diet products (R. 0607, 0648; R. 
1866: 11, 36, 57-58, 69, 75-76,115). During the spring of 1993, defendant ran ads in Utah 
newspapers promising a $1400.00 per month salary and benefits for diet consultants (R. 
0608, 0610-12, 0647-48; R. 1866: 8-11, 69, 95, 101). When someone answered an ad, 
defendant would give a presentation and produce several contracts relating to the diet 
products (R. 0608, 0610, 0613; R. 1866:9-12, 58, 95-97). Defendant purported to explain 
the terms of the contracts and obtained signatures from several people (R. 0608,0611,0613; 
R. 1866:12-13, 15, 31-32). While the individuals believed they were agreeing to take 
delivery of the product to sell in conjunction with consulting, they were instead signing 
contracts to purchase the diet products themselves (R. 0608-11,0614,0648; 1866:12-13,17, 
104-05, 117). Defendant directed the individuals to use the product so as to have first hand 
knowledge of it, then refused attempts to return the product, in part because it had been 
5The facts are taken from the amended information (R. 218-23), and the 
preliminary hearing transcript (R. 1866 & 1867). 
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opened (R. 0608, 0612, 0648; R. 1866: 12-13, 17-18, 53, 59-60, 118-19). Despite 
defendant's promises in the ad and in person, the victims in this case received no salary, 
received none of the promised benefits, and incurred unanticipated debt (R. 0608, 0648; R. 
1866: 12,18,32,42-43, 110-11,61,76-77,99-100,110-11, 115, 117-18). Defendant then 
sued the victims in small claims court for alleged breach of the contracts when the 
individuals refused or could not afford to pay for the diet products (R. 0648; R. 19, 63-64, 
74,78,79-80,100,119,136). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Point I: Defendant raises several challenges to the constitutionality of the charging 
statute in this matter. However, this Court should not review the merits of his claim that the 
potential punishment to be inflicted constituted cruel and unusual punishment because he 
failed to preserve the issue for appellate review. 
Defendant's claim that the statute is overbroad is without merit. Defendant 
establishes no substantial overbreadth where the statute limits its reach to false speech made 
with at least a reckless disregard for the truth. His claim that the statute is unconstitutionally 
vague because of its use of three terms is equally without merit. Because the statute does not 
implicate any constitutionally protected conduct, defendant must show that the statute is 
impermissibly vague in all of its applications. The challenged terms all provide fair notice 
as to what conduct is prohibited by the statute. The language of the statute provided 
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defendant with fair notice that the conduct charged in this case, committed with the object 
of obtaining money, violated the communications fraud statute. 
Finally, the plain language of the statute unambiguously guides the prosecutor's 
charging discretion. The legislature is free to define crimes and punishments and may 
provide a more severe penalty for some variations of a crime than others, regardless of logic. 
Absent any established ambiguity, defendant is not entitled to dismissal of his charges. 
Point II: Defendant argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to accept the 
information that was filed following issuance of what eventually became a premature 
remittitur. However, the trial court had jurisdiction to accept the information for filing upon 
receipt of the first remittitur. Recall of that remittitur six weeks later did not void the filing. 
Further, once the remittitur was recalled, the trial court properly stayed any further 
proceedings in the case pending receipt of the final remittitur. The Utah Supreme Court has 
sanctioned such a situation. See Nielson v. Schiller, Judge, et aL, 92 Utah 137,66 P.2d 365, 
368 (1937). Further, the trial court took no action and issued no order that conflicted with 
the issues relating to the misdemeanor appeal in which the remittitur was recalled. 
Defendant's claim of a due process violation arising from alleged vindictive 
prosecution is not a jurisdictional claim and, hence, is not properly before this Court where 
it was not preserved in defendant's conditional guilty pleas. Moreover, defendant fails to 
establish any reasonable likelihood of vindictive prosecution or prosecutorial bad faith. The 
prosecutors' conduct throughout this case in the filing of each and every information 
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demonstrates a reasonable good faith effort under the particular facts of this case to put the 
appropriate charges before the appropriate court in the face of years of defendant's attempts 
to hinder the prosecution. 
Point III: This Court should refuse to address defendant's final claims of plain error 
and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Defendant fails to identify the issues to which 
these doctrines should be applied, and he does not advance sufficient argument to establish 
that the law involving any error was sufficiently "settled" that it should have been "obvious" 
to the trial court or that any of his trial counsel did not exercise reasonable trial strategy in 
failing to preserve any claim below. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
UTAH'S COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE IS NEITHER 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD NOR VAGUE, AND ITS 
PLAIN LANGUAGE ADEQUATELY AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY 
GUIDES CHARGING DISCRETION BY PERMITTING EACH 
COMMUNICATION TO BE CHARGED AS A SEPARATE OFFENSE, 
THE DEGREE OF WHICH IS DETERMINED BY THE TOTAL 
MONIES OBTAINED OR SOUGHT TO BE OBTAINED BY THE 
SCHEME TO DEFRAUD 
Defendant makes several arguments concerning the constitutionality of Utah's 
communications fraud statute. Br. of App. at 14-36. He first argues that the statute is 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because it does not adequately define several words 
used in the statute. Id. at 16-24. The lack of specificity, he argues, prevents the statute from 
being construed so as to avoid impinging upon freedom of speech, requiring that it be 
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deemed "constitutionally overbroad." Id. at 24-25. Hence, he claims, regardless of its 
applicability to this case, the statute is unconstitutional on its face and warrants reversal of 
his convictions. Id. 
Second, defendant argues that the statute violates the equal protection and uniform 
operation of laws provisions of the state and federal constitutions. Id. at 25-32. He claims 
that the statute provides "unbridled" prosecutorial discretion in deciding to charge a given 
defendant with a series of misdemeanors or with aggregated felonies for the same offenses. 
Id. Defendant argues that the potential for arbitrary discrimination and wide disparities in 
the treatment of similarly situated offenders requires that the statute be held unconstitutional. 
Id. 
Third, defendant argues that the potential for prosecutorial arbitrariness gives rise to 
the possibility of unduly rigorous punishment for those who do not deserve it. Id. at 32-34. 
"Minor offenders," he claims, run the risk of being sentenced as though they were major 
offenders, resulting in cruel and unusual punishment for those individuals, in violation of 
both the state and federal constitutions.6 Id. 
6For the first time on appeal, defendant asserts that permitting multiple charges 
based on the aggregate value of a scheme violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment. Br. of Aplt. at 32-34. Defendant did not raise the 
issue below, let alone make the trial court aware that he had any concern that the statutory 
language "would drastically and unjustly increase punishment for communications fraud" 
to the point that it "could readily result in a sentence so disproportionate as to violate the 
State and federal constitutions." Id. at 32-33. Hence, it is waived on appeal. See Dean, 
2004 UT 45, ^ J13 (appellate court will not address an issue, even a constitutional one, 
raised for the first time on appeal); State v. Munson, 972 P.2d 418, 421 (Utah 1998) (the 
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Finally, defendant contends that the ambiguous statute leads to the potential for 
multiple charges against a single defendant for the same criminal offense in violation of the 
double jeopardy provisions of both the state and federal constitutions. Id. at 34-36. 
A. Section 76-10-1801 Is Neither Unconstitutionally Overbroad Nor Vague 
Defendant's overbreadth and vagueness challenges fail in light of the language of the 
present statute.7 "In a facial challenge to the overbreadth and vagueness of a law, a court's 
raising of a claim on appeal that was not included below as a condition to entry of the 
plea waives appellate consideration of the claim); see also State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 
244,^15, 54 P.3d 645. 
Defendant's argument would also fail under the doctrines of plain error and 
ineffective assistance. Br. of Aplt. at 49. It does not identify "settled appellate law" 
which should have alerted the district court to the allegedly "obvious" constitutional 
errors. See State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah App. 1997) ("a trial court's error is not 
plain where there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial court."). Further, 
defendant's claims necessarily stem from his unnecessarily broad reading of the 
communications fraud statute, which reading was rejected below when the district court 
rejected defendant's overbreadth and vagueness challenges. Hence, counsel is not 
reasonably likely to have prevailed on a motion under the Eighth Amendment, and his 
failure to advance one does not amount to ineffective assistance. See State v. Gallegos, 
967 P.2d 973, 976 (Utah App. 1998) (counsel is not ineffective for failing to file futile 
motions). 
In any event, this Court should not reach the issue because defendant lacks 
standing to make the argument. The argument relies on the "theoretical existence of a 
penalty that was never imposed against him[.]" State v. Morrison, 2001 UT 73, \ 28, 31 
P.3d 547. Defendant pled guilty to two class A misdemeanor charges, each carrying a 
sentence of 365 days (R. 1823-28). Defendant received credit for time served, and the 
court immediately closed the case (R. 1828). Hence, defendant lacks standing to argue 
the constitutionality of a sentence not imposed on him. See Morrison, 2001 UT 73, \ 28. 
throughout his brief, defendant includes references to arguments presented to and 
rejected by the lower courts. Br. of Aplt. at 25, 39-45 (denial of motion for bill of 
particulars, expiration of statute of limitations, use of expunged police report, lack of 
candor in informations). As his view of the arguments was rejected below, and the 
rulings were not preserved in defendant's Sery plea, they have no place in this appeal. 
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first task is to determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of 
constitutionally protected conduct." Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 
Inc., 455 U.S. 489,494,102S.Ct. 1186,1191 (1982), reh'g denied, 456 U.S. 950,102S.Ct. 
2023 (1982); accord State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502, 505 (Utah 1987); Logan City v. Huber, 
786 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Utah App. 1990). If it does, the statute will be deemed invalid for 
overbreadth, and the Court need not reach the vagueness challenge. "If it does not, then the 
overbreadth challenge must fail [and] [t]he court should then examine the facial vagueness 
challenge " Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S at 494-95; accord Hoffman, 733 P.2d at 505; 
Huber, 786 P.2d at 1375. Section 76-10-1801 is neither overbroad nor vague. 
L Section 76-10-1801 is not overbroad. 
Defendant does not contend that he was engaged in constitutionally protected conduct. 
Instead, he claims that the communications fraud statute uMefwhich he was convicted~ls~ 
overbroad under the First Amendment and cannot therefore be applied to him or anyone else. 
Id. at 19-25. Upon review, his claim fails. 
a. The overbreadth doctrine. 
As a general rule, "a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied may 
not challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally 
See Munson, 972 P.2d at 421; State v. Geer, 765 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1988); see also Utah 
R. Crim. P. 11(1) (a conditional plea reserves the right "to a review of the adverse 
determination of any specified pre-trial motion."). 
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to others in situations not before the Court." New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767, 102 
S.Ct. 3348, 3360 (1982); accord Hoffman, 733 P.2d at 505. The First Amendment doctrine 
of overbreadth is an exception to this general rule. Statutory overbreadth "addresses the issue 
of whether 'the statute in question is so broad that it may not only prohibit unprotected 
behavior but may also prohibit constitutionally protected activity as well.'" State v. Hall, 905 
P.2d 899,901 (Utah App. 1995) (quotingState v. Frampton, 131 P.2d 183,192 (Utah 1987)) 
(additional quotation omitted); see also Hoffman, 733 P.2d at 505. 
Because the overbreadth doctrine is "strong medicine," Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 
U.S. 601, 613, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2916 (1973), "[o]nly a statute that is substantially overbroad 
may be invalidated on its face." City of Houston, Tex. v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458, 107 S.Ct. 
2502, 2508 (1987) (citation omitted). It is not enough "that one can conceive of some 
impermissible applications of a statute[.]" Members of the City Council of the City of Los 
Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2126 (1984). The 
overbreadth must be real and substantial. See Ashcroft v. A.C.L. U., 535 U.S. 564, 584,122 
S.Ct. 1700, 1713 (2002) (citing Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615). This is "particularly [true] 
where conduct and not merely speech is involved," as is the case here. Broadrick, 413 U.S. 
at 615. Further, the social costs created by the overbreadth doctrine are great—invalidating 
"all enforcement" of a law which otherwise targets "harmful, constitutionally unprotected 
conduct" Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113,119,123 S.Ct. 2191,2197 (2003) (quotation and 
citation omitted). The overbreadth doctrine is thus "employed [ ] with hesitation, and then 
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'only as a last resort.1" Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769 (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613). 
Consequently, courts "afford statutes a strong presumption of constitutionality, and will, 
whenever possible, construe a statute so as to save it from constitutional infirmities." LM.L. 
v. State, 2002 UT 110, If 25, 61 P.3d 1038 (citations omitted). 
A person claiming overbreadth "bears the burden of demonstrating,' from the text of 
[the law] and from actual fact,' that substantial overbreadth exists." Hicks, 539 U.S. at 122 
(quoting New York State ClubAss'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1,14,108 S.Ct. 2225 
(1988)). The claimant must demonstrate that the statute, "taken as a whole, is substantially 
overbroad judged in relation to its plainly legitimate sweep." Id. (emphasis in original). "In 
short, there must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise 
recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court for it to be facially 
challenged on overbreadth grounds." Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 801 (emphasis 
added). Defendant has demonstrated no such danger. 
b. The statute reaches only unprotected speech. 
On the one hand, defendant argues that section 76-10-1801 requires no intent to 
defraud, but merely a "desire to obtain something of value[.]" Br. of Aplt. at 18-19. He 
claims that the elements of the statute are satisfied as long as there is established a "false 
communication, behavior, or material omission designed to garner 'anything of value[.]m 
Id. at 18, 23-24. On the other hand, defendant correctly acknowledges that the statute 
requires dishonesty and a "reckless disregard for the truth[.]" Id. at 22-23. Indeed, mere 
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proof that a communication is false is not sufficient. The statute requires a showing that the 
false communication was made with the requisite fraudulent intent—that is, proof that "the 
[false or fraudulent] pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions made or 
omitted were made or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the 
truths Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(7) (emphasis added). 
Defendant nevertheless derides the statute, claiming it reaches to falsities made 
outside "any discrete area of legitimate state control," "does not distinguish between fact and 
opinion," and consequently "portends to punish significant amounts of constitutionally 
protected speech." Br. of Aplt. at 21. He essentially challenges the statute's reach to falsities 
made with "a reckless disregard for the truth[.]" Id. at 22. He posits three hypothetical 
examples where the communications fraud statute could assertedly impinge on protected 
speech: (1) a columnist who "intentionally makes bold sarcastic false statements of opinion" 
to improve human behavior, national politics, or column sales; (2) political candidates who 
engage in "puffing" and political commentary "with a reckless disregard for the truth" to 
achieve a political agenda; and (3) advertisers spouting inaccurate assertions about products 
"with a reckless disregard for the truth" to achieve higher sales. Id. at 21-22. These 
hypotheticals are inapposite for varied reasons. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872P.2d999, 
1014-15 (Utah 1994). However, the State need not examine those reasons because 
defendant's claim fails at its inception. It rests on a faulty premise, i.e., that the government 
may not prohibit false speech made with only a reckless disregard for the truth. 
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"Untruthful speech... has never been protected for its own sake." Virginia State Bd. 
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council Inc., 425 U.S. 748,771,96 S.Ct. 1817, 
1830 (1976). The Supreme Court has nevertheless held that the First Amendment affords 
a measure of protection to "some" falsehoods in order to provide the breathing space 
necessary for the exercise of fully protected speech, or "speech that matters." BE & K Const 
Co. v. N.L.R.B., 536 U.S. 516, 531, 122 S.Ct. 2390, 2399 (2002) (quoting Gertz v. Robert 
Welsh, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,341-42,94 S.Ct. 2997 (1974)). Courts have made clear, however, 
that the "breathing space" does not extend to falsehoods made intentionally, knowingly, or 
with a reckless disregard for the truth. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
279-80, 84 S.Ct. 710,726 (1964) (holding that public officials may not recover damages for 
a defamatory falsehood unless it can be proven that the falsehood was made "with knowledge 
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not"); I.M.L., 2002 UT 
110, f 13 (acknowledging falsehoods may be sanctioned if they are made knowingly or 
recklessly); Frampton, 1Z1 P.2d at 192 (holding that "neither the Utah nor the United States 
constitution protects acts made with the intent to defraud . . . . " ) . 
Because the communications fraud statute limits its reach to false speech made with 
at least a reckless disregard for the truth, its reach does not extend to protected speech. 
Defendant has not, therefore, demonstrated that the communications fraud statute is 
"susceptible of application to substantial amounts of [protected] speech[.]" Huber, 786 P.2d 
at 1377. His overbreadth claim therefore fails. 
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h. Section 76-10-1801 is not vague. 
A law that is not overbroad "may nevertheless be challenged on its face as unduly 
vague, in violation of due process." Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 497. Defendant claims 
that the communications fraud statute is unconstitutionally vague in its use of three terms: 
(1) "artifice," (2) "communicate," and (3) "anything of value." Br. of Aplt. at 18. However 
nothing is vague about these terms. 
"[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal 
offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is 
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 (1983). 
Vagueness claims, therefore, "'are essentially procedural due process issues, i.e., whether the 
statute adequately notices the proscribed conduct.1" State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, ^ f 14,491 
Utah Adv. Rep. 41 (quoting Frampton, 131 P.2d at 191-92). "If a statute '"is sufficiently 
explicit to inform the ordinary reader what conduct is prohibited,"' it is not unconstitutionally 
vague." Id. (quoting Frampton, 131 P.2d at 191-92) (additional quotation omitted). Further, 
a statute will not be deemed facially invalid "when a limiting construction . . . could be 
placed on the challenged statute" or a portion of the statute could be severed without 
disturbing the purpose of the statute. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613; accord Provo City v. 
Whatcott, 2000 UT App 86, lfl[ 8, 14, 1 P.3d 1113. 
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Moreover, where the statute "implicates no constitutionally protected conduct," the 
Court will "uphold the challenge only if the [statute] is impermissibly vague in all of its 
applications." Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494-95 (emphasis added); State v. Archambeau, 
820 P.2d 920, 928 (Utah App. 1991). In such cases, the statute "must be examined in light 
of the facts of the case at hand." Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495 n.7 (citation omitted). 
As a result, a defendant whose conduct clearly falls within a challenged statute cannot prevail 
on a vagueness challenge. Id. at 495 n.7. 
As noted above, section 76-10-1801 implicates no constitutionally protected conduct. 
Defendant must therefore demonstrate that the statute "is impermissibly vague in all of its 
applications." Id. at 494-95 (emphasis added). This he has failed to do. 
a. "Artifice" 
Defendant first contends that the term "artifice" is vague. Br. of Aplt. at 18, 22-23. 
Although "artifice" is not defined under the statute, it is commonly understood as a "trick" 
or "a wily or artful stratagem." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 124 (1993). Defendant 
concedes that "artifice" is subject to such a common meaning, but complains that it 
encompasses "any form of dishonesty." Br. of Aplt. at 18, 23. Such a complaint, however, 
goes not to the vagueness of the term, but to its scope. "[A] statute is not unconstitutionally 
vague [simply] because it is broad." State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960,966 (Utah 1989). The 
question is "whether the statute imparts fair notice of what conduct is prohibited." Id. 
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Because "artifice" is a term understood by "ordinary people/' it is not vague, as applied to 
defendant or otherwise. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357. 
b. "Communicate" 
Defendant contends that the term "communicate" is vague because: 1) it is "given the 
broadest possible definition under the statute," and 2) subsection one penalizes 
communication "with any person," without regard to whether a single published utterance 
reaches multiple people and results in multiple charges and without regard to any reliance 
on the utterance. Br. of Aplt. at 18. The term "communicate" is specifically defined under 
the statute to include all forms of communication. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(6). 
However, as already noted, the broad use of a term does not make it vague. See Wareham, 
772 P.2d at 966. The issue is one of fair notice as to what conduct is prohibited. Id. 
c. "Anything of value" 
Finally, defendant contends that "anything of value" is unconstitutionally vague 
because it is not defined, and he posits hypotheticals where the "[ ]thing of value" could 
include things such as "curry [ing] favor[,]" shielding oneself from embarassment, or getting 
a date. Br. of Aplt. at 23. "[T]here is little doubt that imagination can conjure up 
hypothetical cases in which the meaning of [value] will be in nice question." Hill v. 
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 733, 120 S.Ct 2480, 2498 (2000) (quotation omitted). However, 
the object of defendant's fraud in this case was the obtaining of "money," and he has not 
argued that the term "money" is unconstitutionally vague. See Br. of Aplt. at 14-25. 
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Therefore, the statute clearly applies to defendant's conduct, and his vagueness challenge 
must fail. See Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495 n.7. 
B. The Plain Language of the Communications Fraud Statute Provides Clear 
Charging Direction in Conformity with the Federal Constitution 
Defendant also argues that subsections (2) and (5) of the statute violate the equal 
protection and the uniform operation of laws provision because the State could choose to 
aggregate the value of the things sought to be obtained by an accused for purposes of 
charging a single, enhanced offense or charge the defendant with separate counts for each 
separate communication.8 See Br. of Aplt. 25-32. The plain language of the statute, however, 
defeats defendant's claim. 
L The statute belies defendant's claims of ambiguity. 
8Defendant impliedly asserts his claim under the federal constitution. However, 
near the end of his argument, he mentions the state constitution, citing to State v. Mohi, 
901 P.2d 991 (Utah 1995). Br. of Aplt. at 30-32. However, he made no mention of a 
separate state constitutional analysis below (R. 113-16; R. 153: 1-36). Neither did the 
state or the trial court address the state constitution (R. 119-23; R. 153: 1-36). 
Consequently, this Court need not reach the merits of a separate state constitutional 
challenge. See State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 140 (Utah App. 1997); State v. Davis, 
903 P.2d 940, 942 n.5 (Utah App. 1995), rev'don other grounds 972 P.2d 388. 
In addition, the claims would fail under both the plain error and ineffective 
assistance doctrines. Br. of Aplt. at 49. First, defendant fails to identify any "settled 
appellate law" that should have alerted the district court to any "obvious" error. See Ross, 
951 P.2d at 239 (a trial court does not commit plain error absent settled appellate law to 
guide it). Second, the statute unambiguously directs charging discretion, permitting for 
uniform operation of the statute. See text herewith. Hence, no obvious error existed for 
the district court to identify, and no ineffective assistance occurred for counsel's failure to 
submit what would have been a futile motion. See Gallegos, 967 P.2d at 976 (no 
ineffectiveness for failing to file futile motions). 
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Defendant concedes that one subsection of Utah's communications fraud statute 
permits each communication made in furtherance of a scheme to defraud to be charged as 
a separate criminal offense. Br. of Aplt. at 25, 32. Defendant also concedes that another 
subsection of the same statute directs that the degree of the offense is determined by the total 
monies obtained or sought to be obtained by the scheme. Id. However, defendant claims 
that nothing in section 76-10-1801 directs the prosecutor in choosing how to charge multiple 
communications against a single defendant. Id. at 30-32. This unfettered discretion, he 
argues, permits similarly situated persons to be treated dissimilarly at the whim of the 
prosecutor. Id. Absent adequate charging direction for the prosecutors, he argues, the statute 
is so ambiguous as to be constitutionally invalid. Id. However, defendant's argument 
ignores the plain language of the statute and the law of statutory construction. The plain 
language of the statute adequately directs the prosecution of multiple crimes and sufficiently 
defines the offense to withstand defendant's constitutional challenges. 
It is well-recognized that "[w]hen interpreting statutes, [a court's] primary goal is to 
evince the true intent and purpose of the Legislature." State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, f 8, 
52 P.3d 1276 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); accord State v. Hardy, 2002 
UT App 244, f 10, 452 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. The best evidence of a statute's meaning is its 
plain language, which the court must assume was selected "advisedly and in accordance with 
its ordinary meaning." Martinez, 2002 UT 80, <][ 8. "'When language is clear and 
unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for 
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construction.'" Hardy, 2002 UT App 244,f10 (quoting Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P. 
%12, S75 (Utah 1995)). Moreover, courts must look to all provisions of a statute to "' avoid 
interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative.5" Martinez 
at If 8 and Hardy at f 10 (both quoting Hall v. Utah Dept of Corrections, 2001 UT 34, f 15, 
24P.3d958). 
Subsection (1) of section 76-10-1801 states: 
Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to 
obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false 
of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and 
who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the 
purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of 
[communications fraud]. 
Subsection (2) directs: 
The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall be 
measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or 
sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) 
except [when the object of the scheme is other than the "obtaining of 
something of monetary value"]. 
Subsection (5) of section 76-10-1801 provides: 
Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or concealing 
a scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and offense 
of communication fraud. 
Defendant contends that the statutory language permits the prosecutor to choose, at 
will, from four prosecutorial options, or a combination thereof, for any given case: 
1. The prosecutor can charge each communication separately; 
2. The prosecutor can charge each reception of a fraudulent representation 
separately; 
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3. The prosecutor can aggregate all communications into a single charge 
targeting the overall scheme; and/or 
4. The prosecutor can charge multiple maximum level offenses for each 
communication based on the aggregate of damages. 
Br. of Aplt. at 27-31. He argues that this unbridled charging discretion may occur without 
any legislative justification for the disparity. Id. at 31. 
When read properly, there is no unconstitutional ambiguity in the charging statute that 
gives rise to all the above options. Id. at 32. Read together, subsection (5) plainly governs 
the number of offenses permitted to be charged, while subsection (2) plainly governs the 
degree of each of those offenses. See discussion, infra, at subsection 2. A proper reading 
of that language establishes that defendant's second option is not valid under the statute. 
Subsection 5 permits but does not require the prosecutor to charge for "[e]ach separate 
communication[.]" See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(5). While he can charge for less than 
each communication, he has no authority under the plain language of the statute to charge 
more. Hence, where defendant's second option would result in an increase in the numbers 
of charges, it is not permitted by the statute. 
Further, all persons committing the offense of communications fraud are subject to 
the same measure of prosecution: each faces prosecution based on the number of 
communications they advance. See id. The prosecutor is unable to increase the charges 
beyond that amount, i.e., to subject an accused to an increase in the number of charges 
beyond what the accused's conduct establishes. He may, however, reduce the charges based 
on a multitude of factors, although he is not required to do so. Further, where the statute 
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dictates how the degree of any offense "shall be measured[,]" the prosecutor's discretion is 
minimal. See id. (emphasis added). 
Defendant cites to several communications fraud cases, speculating about what the 
prosecutor in each could have charged under his interpretation of the charging statute and 
pointing out how widely disparate the charges could be. Br. of Aplt. at 27-29. His argument 
fails to establish his claim of unconstitutional ambiguity. Instead, the cases demonstrate that 
prosecutors regularly choose to charge less than the amount permitted by the statute's plain 
language. The cases were all properly charged under the plain language of the charging 
statute, permitting, but not requiring, a charge for each communication (see infra, at 
subsection 2). See State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 425, 2003 WL 22922435 (unpublished 
opinion) (one charge for multiple communications with a single victim); State v. Nichols, 
2003 UT App 287,76 P.3d 1173, cert, denied, 84 P.3d 249 (Utah 2003) (five charges for five 
victims involved in the sale of three cars; three victims owned the cars defendant was to sell, 
and two victims were buyers; multiple communications to some victims was apparent); State 
v. Silva, 2000 UT App 292, 13 P.3d 604 (one charge for a single taped call to the victim; the 
subsequent eight calls were taped and used at trial as voice identification evidence); State v. 
Ross, 951 P.2d 236 (Utah App. 1997) (defendant had one person cash thirty-five to forty 
forged checks for him over a period of time, nine checks were recovered, and the forgeries 
were proven to be worth at least $10,500; one charge of communications fraud for soliciting 
the person to cash the checks; appellate challenge and affirmance were based on value of 
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fraud).9 In each of these cases, the prosecutor was permitted by the charging statute to charge 
for each communication, but chose, instead, to charge based on the number of victims. 
Because it is the prerogative of the legislature to define crimes and punishments, this 
Court may not "comment on the legislature's wisdom" in enacting criminal statutes. 
Martinez, 2002 UT 80, f^ 15. Nor is a penalty susceptible to challenge merely because it is 
more severe for some variations of a crime than others. Cf State v. Mace, 921 P.2d 1372, 
1377 (Utah 1996) (recognizing that an appellate court "may not require the legislature to 
select the least severe penalty possible"). Indeed, the legislature may impose harsher 
penalties on certain crimes even if logic does not compel them to do so. State v. Clark, 632 
P.2d 841, 843 (Utah 1981) (recognizing that "[i]t is not unconstitutional for a state to impose 
a more severe penalty for a particular type of crime than the penalty which is imposed with 
respect to the general category of crimes to which the special crime is related or of which it 
is a subcategory"). See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1 )(e) (making communications 
fraud a second degree felony whenever the object sought to be obtained by the scheme is 
"other than the obtaining of something of monetary value"); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
9The remaining opinion contains insufficient information to review the basis of 
those charges. See State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, 17 P.3d 1153 (five 
communications fraud convictions challenged for one of two defendants involving 
accounting and billing practices, more than twelve patients and related insurance forms 
were produced at trial, but no information on the number of insurance providers 
defendant billed for services not rendered). 
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412(l)(a)(iv) & (b)(iii) (1999) (making theft of any item from "the person of another" a 
second degree felony and theft of a chicken or any livestock a third degree felony). 
In sum, section 76-10-1801 reflects the legislature5s prerogative to consider not only 
the injury caused by a fraudulent scheme, but also the nature and breadth of the scheme in 
determining culpability. Cf State v. Kent ,945?.2d 145,148(UtahApp. 1997) (recognizing 
legitimacy of legislature providing greater punishment for computer fraud simply because 
computer crimes are "difficult to police and have a greater potential for ruinous 
consequences"). 
Z, Section 76-10-1801 Clearly Establishes The Unit of Prosecution, 
Clearly, the legislative prerogative to define crimes and punishments must be 
exercised within constitutional parameters. In reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, a 
court is obligated to presume the statute valid and "resolve any reasonable doubts in favor 
of constitutionality." Martinez, 2002 UT 80, ^ 6 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). Moreover, a "'statute should be held valid unless there is a clear, complete and 
unmistakable violation of some provision of the constitution.'" State v. Tebbs, 786 P.2d 775, 
778 (Utah App. 1990) (quotingPride Club, Inc. v. State, 481 P.2d669,670-71 (Utah 1971)). 
Here, defendant argues subsections (2) and (5) cannot both apply because such a result 
would subject him to multiple prosecutions for the same offense and, thereby, violate the 
federal prohibition against double jeopardy. Br. of Aplt. at 32-35. More specifically, 
defendant contends that section 76-10-1801 does not clearly define the allowable "unit of 
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prosecution" and, therefore, the statue is ambiguous. Id. at 35. Because section 76-10-1801 
plainly defines the allowable "unit of prosecution" and that unit permits multiple felonies to 
be charged, defendant's constitutional arguments fail. 
The Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution prohibits multiple punishments for 
the same offense.10 State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1230 (Utah 1998). This variation of 
double jeopardy, commonly referred to as "multiplicity," "prohibits the Government from 
charging a single offense in several counts and is intended to prevent multiple punishments 
for the same act." State v. Morrison, 2001 UT 73, f 24, 31 P.3d 547 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). Whether charges are multiplicitious is resolved by determining 
the allowable "unit of prosecution" intended by the legislature for a given crime. United 
States v. Bell, 349 U.S. 81, 82, 75 S. Ct. 620 (1955). This, in turn, is resolved by the plain 
language of the statute. State v. Adel, 965 P.2d 1072,1074 (Wash. 1998) (recognizing that 
while determination of the designated unit of prosecution is of "constitutional magnitude," 
it is ultimately resolved by statutory interpretation and legislative intent); see also State v. 
Green, 534 S.E.2d 395,400 (W.Va. 2000) ("[a] claim that double jeopardy has been violated 
10
 Defendant's argument is predicated on the Fifth Amendment, with only nominal 
reference to the comparable state constitutional provision. Br. of Aplt. At 34-35. 
Separate state constitutional analysis, therefore, is waived. See State v. Pizel, 1999 UT 
App 270, \ 4 n.l, 987 P.2d 1288. In any case, state and federal double jeopardy 
provisions are co-extensive. State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1230 (Utah 1998). 
Because defendant's claim under the federal constitution fails, see discussion in Part 
1(B)(2), he also would not prevail under the doctrines of plain error or ineffective 
assistance of counsel. See id.; Gallegos, 967 P.2d at 976 (counsel is not ineffective for 
failing to file futile motions). 
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based on multiple punishments imposed after a single trial is resolved by determining the 
legislative intent as to punishment In other words, the Double Jeopardy Clause takes the 
substantive criminal law as it finds it") (internal quotations omitted). 
Here, the legislature clearly defined the allowable "unit of prosecution": section 76-
10-1801 (5) directs that every communication made in furtherance of the scheme is a separate 
offense. Section 76-10-1801 (2) specifies that the degree of an offense is determined by the 
total value of the scheme. An accused will not, as defendant claims, be punished for the 
same act multiple times. Each criminal act, each communication to a victim, is punished only 
once, but the degree of punishment for that individual act (i.e., each communication to a 
victim) is determined by the overall value of the scheme. From a penalogical perspective, 
the result is no different than designating all communications fraud, regardless of value, as 
felonies and then prosecuting each communication made in furtherance of the fraud as a 
separate offense - a statutory scheme followed federally and by some jurisdictions. See 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1341 & 1343 (making frauds committed by use of mail, wire, radio, or television 
punishable by up to a million-dollar fine and 30-years imprisonment); Badders v. United 
States, 240 U.S. 391, 394, 36 S. Ct. 367, 368 (1916) (each communication made in 
furtherance of a fraud may be charged as a separate crime); United States v. Kennedy, 64 
F.3d 1465,1476 (10th Cir. 1995) (same); Ariz. Statutes §§ 13-2310(D) & 13-1801(B) (2001) 
(designating any communications fraud, regardless of value, as a class two felony, but 
permitting multiple fraud, "whether the amounts were taken from one or several persons," 
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to be aggregated into a single count, in the discretion of the prosecutor, so that if $100,000 
or more is obtained, sentence may not be suspended and probation may not be imposed); Fla. 
Statutes § 817.034(3) & (4) (2000) (permitting aggregation to determine the degree of the 
crime of "organized fraud" (racketeering), while not providing for aggregation in 
communications frauds, but designating all communications frauds over $300 as felonies, 
and permitting separate judgments and sentences to be imposed for racketeering and for each 
communication made as long as both involved the same scheme). 
In sum, the plain language of section 76-10-1801 permits the number of offenses to 
be determined by the number of communications made and the degree of any offense to be 
determined by the overall value of the scheme. Where defendant met his multitude of 
victims through newspaper ads, interviewed them at least once either alone or in groups, and 
discussed with them their contracts, he could have faced more than the twelve th ird-degree 
charges contained in the final amended information. Because the communications fraud 
statute is neither unconstitutionally overbroad nor unconstitutionally vague, and its plain 
language establishes the unit of prosecution and reasonably guides the prosecution in the 
charging and prosecution of the number and degree of offenses, defendant's claims fail. 
C. The Statute Need Not Be Construed In Defendant's Favor Nor Stricken Entirely 
Because No Ambiguity Exists. 
Relying on his argument that the interplay of subsections (2) and (5) of section 76-10-
1801 is ambiguous, defendant acknowledges that under the federal law, the relief would be 
to construe the statute with lenity, i.e., in his favor. Br. of Aplt. at 36. However, he urges 
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that this Court should refuse to essentially rewrite the statute to provide the requisite lenity 
and, instead, should strike the statute on constitutional grounds. Id. He argues that "the 
unique separation of powers provision of the Utah Constitution" permits Utah appellate 
courts to strike statutes which do not meet constitutional standards. Id. 
Defendant does not argue that the rule of lenity has been adopted in Utah or that it 
should apply to his situation. Indeed, Utah appellate courts have not formally recognized the 
"rule of lenity" as a rule of statutory construction. See, e.g., Green, 534 S.E.2d at 403 n.13 
("when the Legislature fails to indicate the allowable unit of prosecution and sentence with 
clarity, doubt as to the legislative intent should be resolved in favor of lenity for the 
accused." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Instead, after interpreting a 
statute, Utah courts have applied the "rule of lenity" to accord a defendant the lesser of two 
applicable penalties. SeeStatev. Kenison, 2000 XJT App 322, ^ j 8,14P.3d 129 (quoting State 
v. Yates, 918 P.2 136, 138 (Utah App. 1996)); State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 385 (Utah 
App. 1997). 
In any case, all courts agree that a defendant is not entitled to lenity unless a statute 
is ambiguous. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576,587,101 S.Ct. 2524,2531 (1981) 
(concluding that rule of lenity was inapplicable because no statutory ambiguity existed); 
Kenison, 2000 UT App 322, <|f 10 ("where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, 
we do not look beyond the language's plain meaning to divine legislative intent") (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted); accord Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, f^ 10 ("[w]hen 
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language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room 
is left for construction") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, as no 
ambiguity exists, as discussed above, not only does lenity not apply, but defendant is not 
entitled to have the statute stricken as unconstitutional. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ACCEPT THE 
FILING OF AN INFORMATION IN THE FACE OF AN APPARENTLY 
VALID REMITTITUR; THE FILING DID NOT VIOLATE THE 
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION DOCTRINE; DEFENDANT'S 
PROSECUTORIAL VINDICTIVENESS/DUE PROCESS CLAIM WAS 
NOT PRESERVED AND, ON ITS MERITS, WOULD NOT PREVAIL 
Defendant claims that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this 
case, requiring that his pleas be withdrawn and the case dismissed with prejudice. Br. of 
Aplt. at 36-39. He argues that the multiple informations in this case were filed in the district 
court prior to receipt of the remittitur from the misdemeanor appeal, robbing the trial court 
of subject matter jurisdiction, and rendering all the proceedings in the district court null and 
void. Id. at 36-38. He also alleges a violation of the concurrent jurisdiction doctrine, 
claiming that the doctrine was violated when the last case with Judge Reese (case no. 
971005698) was filed while a motion to dismiss with prejudice was pending before Judge 
Dever. Id. at 38-39. 
Additionally, defendant argues that the filing of multiple informations violated his due 
process rights, again ultimately robbing the district court of jurisdiction to enter his pleas. 
Id at 39-46. 
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A. The District Court had Jurisdiction to Accept an Information for Filing 
Following Issuance of a Remittitur and to Stay the Matter following Recall of the 
Remittitur Six Weeks Later, 
Defendant contends that because the prosecutor filed the May 15 information in this 
case before the remittitur from the misdemeanor appeal was issued, the trial court was 
without subject matter jurisdiction to accept the filing, and all proceedings which occurred 
thereafter are null and void. Br. of Aplt. at 36-38. However, the specific facts of this case 
as well as the relevant case law are against his position. 
Defendant's argument omits a crucial fact: the misdemeanor appeal was remitted 
before the State filed the May 15 information. A remittitur was received in the district court 
on May 13, 1997, and the State put the aging case before the district court by filing an 
information on May 15 (R. 0166, 0189-97, 0233, 0402, 0815-23). 
However, defendant sought review of the Court of Appeals' dismissal of the 
misdemeanor appeal, which prompted the Utah Supreme Court to recall the remittitur six 
weeks after it had issued (R. 210, 214, 0398, 0791-92, 0795, 1066-67). Until that time, the 
felony information was duly filed after the district court appeared to have properly acquired 
jurisdiction. After recall of the remittitur, the district court refused to dismiss the charges on 
defendant's motion but stayed the case pending issuance of a final remittitur (R. 0405,0810-
i i ) . 
The same course of action has been approved by the Utah Supreme Court under 
similar circumstances. See Nielson v. Schiller, Judge, et al, 92 Utah 137, 66 P.2d 365, 368 
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(1937) (where suits between the same parties and involving the same subject-matter are 
pending in two different courts in different counties, the supreme court stayed the 
proceedings in trial court pending termination of the proceedings in the other court where the 
first case was filed). Consonant with the ruling in Niels on, the trial court affirmatively 
recognized the recall of the remittitur when it was brought to his attention. Whether or not 
defendant had a constitutional right to seek the additional appellate review under these facts, 
neither the State nor the trial court proceeded to move the district court matter forward. The 
State limited itself to responding to defendant's multiple pleadings in both the appeal and the 
district court matter, and the trial court ultimately halted defendant's filings, refusing to 
entertain them until the final remittitur issued. Only when defendant's certiorari efforts 
ultimately failed and a final remittitur issued did the DA's office and the trial court move 
forward on the information pending in the district court. 
Defendant lacks relevant authority to support his claim. He points to Hi-Country 
Estates v. Foothills Water Co., 942 P.2d 305 (Utah 1996), to argue that an information filed 
during a time when an appeal is prematurely remitted is invalid. Br. of Aplt. at 37-38. 
However, that decision is not controlling. After a remittitur had issued following a direct 
appeal in that case, the trial court modified the judgment upon which the appeal had been 
based. 942 P.2d at 305-06. The appellate court thereafter recalled the remittitur to permit 
the filing and disposition of a petition for writ of certiorari. Id. The court ultimately ruled 
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that the trial court lacked jurisdiction "to enter a judgment or an order of any kind" during 
the period between issuance and recall of the premature remittitur. Id. at 307. 
In Hi-Country, the trial court' s action in modifying the judgment during the period of 
a premature remittitur affected the rights of the parties and the issue on appeal. Id. at 307. 
The mere acceptance of an information for filing had no similar affect on the parties or the 
appellate court in the misdemeanor appeal here. There was no "judgment or an order of any 
kind" entered by the trial court touching on the merits of the appeal, and no action by the 
district court judge amounting to the "exercise [of] jurisdiction" in the sense used in Hi-
Country. 
Moreover, even if Hi-Country applied, it did not restrict the district court's ability to 
act as to every action. See Hi-Country, 942 P.2d at 307 (holding that the trial court could not 
"enter a judgment" during the period of a premature remittitur, but agreeing, in dicta, with 
a defense argument that execution of a judgment would not be stayed by the filing of a 
petition for certiorari review). The Supreme Court held that the situation in Hi-Country 
"exemplifie[d] the basis for the rule prohibiting the trial court from exercising jurisdiction 
in a case while it is on appeal." Id. (emphasis added); see also State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 
362 (Utah App. 1993). At the same time, the Court expressly provided that the trial court had 
limited jurisdiction to act during the pendency of an appeal. Where, as here, the district court 
merely accepted an information for filing while the court appeared to have jurisdiction, the 
filing did not affect the appeal, and the district court stayed the matter as soon as it became 
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clear the appeal was on-going, the district court's actions did not violate the ruling in Hi-
Country. 
B. The Facts at Hand do not Run Afoul of the Concurrent Jurisdiction Doctrine 
Defendant claims that the prosecutor's filing of multiple informations in the district 
court violated the concurrent jurisdiction doctrine. Br. of Aplt. at 38-39. However, the 
district court's actions did nothing to conflict with any ruling of any other court involved in 
this case and, hence, did not run afoul of that doctrine. 
The doctrine states, "[w]here two actions between the same parties, on the same 
subject, and to test the same rights, are brought in different courts having concurrent 
jurisdiction," the court first acquiring jurisdiction may decide the matter before it without 
interference from another court of coordinate power. Nielson, 66 P.2d at 368 (quoting 
Escalante Co. v. Kent, 79 Utah 26, 7 P.2d 276, 278 (1932)) (additional quotation omitted). 
The doctrine derives from comity, avoids "conflict in the execution of judgments by 
independent courts," and prevents the "calamitous results" that would arise from any other 
rule. Id. 
The State filed it's action in the district court in the belief that the misdemeanor appeal 
was completed. The district court's stay of the case after recall of the remittitur was entirely 
appropriate to avoid a concurrent jurisdiction problem. The same solution has been used by 
the Utah Supreme Court when faced with a concurrent jurisdiction problem. See Nielson, 
66 P.2d at 368. InNielson, the Utah Supreme Court found a concurrent jurisdiction violation 
39 
in a situation where two parties, first involved in a district court matter in Sevier county, were 
also involved in a dispute in Salt Lake county in which the issues were the same. 66 P.2d at 
365. The Salt Lake court issued an order purporting to stay the proceedings in the Sevier 
court. Id. at 367. The Utah Supreme Court found a violation of the concurrent jurisdiction 
doctrine and imposed a stay of proceedings in the Salt Lake court pending completion of 
proceedings in the Sevier court. Id. at 368. Where a stay of proceedings sufficed to cure the 
situation in Nielson, the stay issued by the district court in this case was a proper response 
under the facts at hand. Consequently, none of the conflict or "calamitous results" sought 
to be prevented by the concurrent jurisdiction doctrine were at risk in this case, and the 
"successive prosecutions" did not run afoul of the doctrine. 
Defendant also complains of the prosecutor's filing of an information at a time when 
defendant's motion to dismiss with prejudice was pending before Judge Dever based on an 
earlier information filed by the State. Br. of Aplt. at 38-39. However, Judge Dever had 
already dismissed the, previous information without prejudice pending dismissal of the 
misdemeanor appeal (R. 0166, 0189-97, 0232-33, 0400-02, 0809, 0815-23). Add. B. 
Because there were not two matters on the same subject testing the same rights in two 
different courts having concurrent jurisdiction, there was no violation of the concurrent 
jurisdiction doctrine. See Nielson, 66 P.2d at 368. 
C. No Prosecutorial Vindictiveness or Due Process Violation Exists to Warrant 
Dismissal of this Case 
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Defendant claims that the prosecution abused its power to harass him and to punish 
him for asserting his rights in the misdemeanor appeal and repeatedly seeking dismissal of 
the informations filed against him. Br. of Aplt. at 13. This vindictiveness, he argues, violated 
his constitutional due process rights and robbed the lower court of subject matter jurisdiction 
prior to entry of his guilty pleas. Id. at 44-46. He claims the matter is jurisdictional because 
if the trial court had properly dismissed the matter on this basis, it would have been without 
jurisdiction to accept his guilty pleas. Id. at 46. He seeks an order from this Court that the 
information underlying his convictions be dismissed and the government be forbidden from 
prosecuting him further on the offenses at hand. Id. at 45. These claims lack merit. 
L Defendant's Due Process Claim is Not a Valid Jurisdictional Claim and 
Is Not Properly Before this Court 
Defendant claims that the action should have been dismissed with prejudice prior to 
entry of his guilty pleas, and that, had such an event occurred, the court would have lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction to accept his pleas. Br. of Aplt. at 43. Subject matter jurisdiction 
is an issue which may be raised at any time. See State v. Perank, 858 P.2d 927, 930-31 (Utah 
1992). But defendant does not present a jurisdictional issue here. No more could be said of 
this claim than any claim of error on the merits for which dismissal with prejudice would be 
the appropriate remedy. That does not render the issue jurisdictional. As the claim is not 
jurisdictional, it may be reviewed only if preserved below. See State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 
77 (Utah 1990). Defendant's conditional guilty plea did not preserve this due process 
challenge (R. 1822). Hence, this Court should refuse to review it. 
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Defendant cites to Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), as establishing the 
jurisdictional nature of his claim. Br. of Aplt. at 45-47. He argues that Blackledge holds that 
a prosecutor's decision to file misdemeanor charges prevents the prosecutor from ever filing 
a "more serious charge" against a defendant without violating defendant's due process rights. 
Id. at 47. However, the Blackledge holding is not that broad, and its facts are readily 
distinguishable from this case. North Carolina prosecuted Blackledge for a misdemeanor and 
obtained a conviction. 417U.S. at22. Blackledge appealed, which entitled him, under North 
Carolina law, to a trial de novo, annulling the prior conviction. Id. at 22. North Carolina 
responded by obtaining an indictment on a felony charge based on the same underlying facts. 
Id. at 23. Blackledge pled guilty and filed a federal post-conviction action. Id. The federal 
court found that the "potential for vindictiveness" by the prosecutor following reversal of 
defendant's conviction on appeal prevented the refiling of felony charges. Id. at 28. In other 
words, it was defendant's pursuit of an appeal following his conviction and his prevailing in 
that appeal that led to the potential for vindictiveness in the refiling of a more serious charge. 
The same potential does not exist here. Defendant was not convicted of the 
misdemeanor charges, and he did not take the appeal. The matter was dismissed by a judge 
who believed the charges should have been felony charges from the beginning. The State 
appealed. Obviously, the appeal created no incentive for the prosecutor to retaliate. As 
Blackledge does not address the facts of this case, it does not support defendant's contention 
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that this matter is jurisdictional and is entitled to appellate review without regard to the 
preservation rule. 
Should this Court deem the argument to be jurisdictional, it will find, upon review, 
that the claim is without merit. 
2i The Record Demonstrates no Reasonable Likelihood of Vindictive 
Prosecution or Bad Faith. 
It is not the number of filings that establishes vindictive prosecution, but the 
circumstances surrounding them that bear on the prosecutor's reasoning. To establish 
vindictive prosecution, a defendant must show "either (1) actual vindictiveness, or (2) a 
realistic likelihood of vindictiveness which will give rise to a presumption of vindictiveness. 
Thereafter, the burden shifts to the prosecution to justify its decision with legitimate, 
articulable, objective reasons." United States v. P.KR, Inc., 965 F.2d 848, 860 (10th Cir. 
1992) (quoting United States v. Raymer, 941 F.2d 1031, 1040 (10th Cir. 1991)); see also 
Blackledge, All U.S. at 27 ("the Due Process Clause is not offended by all possibilities of 
increased punishment upon retrial after appeal, but only by those that pose a realistic 
likelihood of Vindictiveness.5")/ State v. Brule, 981 P.2d 782, 784 (N.M. 1999) (defendant 
must make an affirmative showing of bad faith or some showing of "a particularly severe, 
prejudicial, and repugnant due process violation"). 
Defendant cites to a thirty-seven-year-old federal district court opinion, United States 
v. American Honda Motor Co., 273 F.Supp. 810 (N.D., 111. Sep. 18, 1967), for the 
proposition that due process does "not permit the government to harass a criminal defendant 
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by bringing multiple charges, and requiring the defendant to litigate, in different courts." Br. 
of Aplt. at 40. However, American Honda is inapposite. In American Honda, the 
government had issued multiple subpoenas around the country calling for the same massive 
quantities of documents. 273 F.Supp. at 819-20. Because the case involved a national price-
fixing conspiracy, there was theoretically no end to the number of subpoenas that could issue 
for the same massive amount of documents. Id. The Fifth Circuit Court found that issuance 
of so many identical subpoenas constituted "the sort of harassment which fundamental 
fairness and the due process clause prohibit." Id. at 820. 
In contrast, the instant case involves an honest effort on the part of the State to 
properly place a single prosecution before the proper court by filing charges in the district 
court only after the previous charges were dismissed without prejudice. Defendant, not the 
State, kept the matter alive in numerous courts because of his repeated filings in various 
courts. Even after recall of the remittitur, defendant was required to appear in the district 
court while the appeal remained active solely because of his own repeated filings. The 
prosecution did not proceed with the case once the remittitur was recalled and refrained from 
doing more than answering defendant's pleadings until after the matter was ultimately and 
finally remitted. 
Defendant's reliance on State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), is also misplaced. 
Brickey involved refiling after the State failed to show probable cause at the preliminary 
hearing. 714 P.2d at 647. It has no application to the situation at hand, and provides no 
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support for defendant's attempt to prevent the prosecution's efforts to pursue its charges long 
before a preliminary hearing was ever held. See State v. Atencio, 2004 UT App 93, ^ f 21, 89 
P.3d 191 ("new" evidence is required for refiling charges where the original charges were 
dismissed on the merits). Defendant's use of Brickey in the absence of a case more 
analagous to the one at hand reveals his claim for what it really is: an attempt to enlarge a 
constitutional doctrine without support for changing the law. 
"When no 'potential abusive practices' on the part of the prosecution are involved, 
'there is no presumptive bar to refiling.'" 2004 UT App. 93 at If 13 (quoting State v. Morgan, 
2001 UT 87, | 16, 34 P.3d 767). Mere inconvenience resulting from good faith refilings 
does not implicate the due process clause. See Morgan, 2001 UT 87, f 22. This is because 
the '"nature of the criminal justice system necessarily inconveniences those individuals who 
have been accused of crimes.'" Id. (quoting People v. Noline, 917 P.2d 1256, 1264 (Colo. 
1996)). Instead, the focus is on "potential bad faith or misconduct of prosecutors." Id. 
Defendant cannot establish abusive practices or bad faith in this case. He touts the 
multiple information filings and the increase in charges, but under the specific facts of this 
case they represent only the prosecution's good faith attempts to place the prosecution and 
the results of an on-going investigation before the appropriate court in the face of years of 
defendant's attempts to forestall any felony prosecution. 
The original misdemeanor filing became a felony information only because the judge 
determined that he lacked jurisdiction over the charges. The West Valley City prosecutor 
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appealed, demonstrating his belief that misdemeanors were proper and appropriate in this 
case. The premature filing of felony counts arose from the transfer of the case to the DA's 
office and the new prosecutor's determination of the appropriate charge given the 
information it received and its additional investigation (R. 1788-89). Once the new 
prosecutor discovered the filing was premature (because of the pending appeal), he sought 
to dismiss the appeal. The prosecution gained nothing from the untimely filing, and the 
State's attempt to dismiss the appeal negates a claim of bad faith. As the district court noted 
at the time, charges could properly be refiled upon completion of the appeal. Upon issuance 
of a dismissal order by the appellate court, the prosecutor again prematurely filed a felony 
information. Absent a remittitur, the matter was dismissed without prejudice with no 
discernable benefit to either party. 
Two days after the remittitur issued, the State filed the May 15 information (R. 2-11). 
Nothing suggested the remittitur was not final, and the additional charges were supported 
by additional investigation (R. 1788-89). Defendant sought and obtained recall of the 
remittitur six weeks later, ultimately resulting in a stay of the felony case. Once defendant 
exhausted his appeal rights, a final remittitur issued. Because the May 15 information was 
still pending in the district court, the judge was able to set the matter for preliminary hearing. 
These circumstances demonstrate the prosecution's attempts to promptly move the 
case forward in the most efficient manner possible in the proper forum. There was no forum 
shopping or other abusive practice designed to benefit the State, to work to defendant's 
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detriment, or to punish defendant for any exercise of his constitutional rights. The State 
made every reasonable effort at every turn to remedy the problems that arose so that a 
prosecution could go forward. There is nothing in the prosecution's pursuit of the case that 
reasonably suggests a vindictive motive on the prosecutor's part. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS OF PLAIN ERROR AND INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE REJECTED FOR INADEQUATE 
BRIEFING 
Defendant's final claim purports to assert both the plain error and the ineffective 
assistance of counsel doctrines as alternative bases upon which this Court should reach the 
merits of the claims he argues elsewhere in his brief. Br. of Aplt. at 49-50. Defendant does 
not identify which errors were plain or which points counsel should have advanced on his 
behalf. He simply makes a blanket statement that "To the degree that the prior lawyers on 
this case did not preserve the issues discussed above, this Court should" do so. Id. at 49. 
This is inadequate to meet his briefing requirements under Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure.11 See State v. Garner, 2002 UT App 234, t 12, 52 P.3d 467. 
Defendant makes no attempt to identify any specific issue for review under either 
doctrine. Instead, counsel represents that all the issues raised in the brief were preserved 
1
 defendant's assertion of plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel is not 
identified either in defendant's statement of the issues or in his Summary of Argument. 
Br. of Aplt at 1-2, 13-14. 
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below. Br. of Aplt. at 1-2. Each Point in defendant's brief includes multiple arguments, 
some of which were preserved in the form of his conditional guilty pleas, some of which 
were raised below but were not included within the scope of the pleas, and some of which 
were not raised at all. Yet defendant makes no distinction between the arguments. Aside 
from a brief mention of the legal standard for each doctrine, defendant's one-page argument 
consists of two sentences, a single case, and a summary claim of prejudice. Id. at 49-50. 
Defendant instead contends that the law contained elsewhere throughout the brief "should 
have been plain to the trial lawyers and the lower courts" and that "the fundamental 
principles of law" discussed elsewhere were "well-established" at the time of defendant's 
motions. Id. at 49. 
This form of argument does not meet defendant's burden to overcome "the strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance" in this procedurally-complicatedmatter. See Tennyson, 850P.2dat468. Without 
identifying any particular claim or counsel, defendant has wholly failed to address the 
presumption. 
Neither does defendant establish the obviousness of any trial court error. He has 
admitted in this appeal that the constitutionality of the charging statute is currently at issue 
in other cases. See Conditional Stipulation to Necessary Extensions of Time for State to File 
Responsive Brief, on file with this Court. Still, he makes no effort to explain why the law 
on that issue should be viewed as sufficiently "settled" to permit any claim that the trial court 
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should have recognized the unpreserved error(s). See State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236,239 (Utah 
App. 1997) ("Utah courts have repeatedly held that a trial court's error is not plain where 
there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial court."). 
In view of these omissions, defendant has not provided any "meaningful analysis" 
of the issues under either doctrine, and the State is unable to formulate a relevant response. 
See State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT Ap 305, 989 P.2d 503. Accordingly, this Court should 
decline to address defendant's claims of plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel. 
See State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, \ 28, 48 P.3d 872 (declining to address inadequately 
briefed issue). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
defendant's convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this > ^ d a y of July, 2004. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
[S C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
49 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that o? true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee 
were hand-delivered/mailed first class, postage pre-paid, to Elizabeth Hunt, attorney for 
defendant/appellant, 3194 South 1100 East, #202, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106, this ^<£?ciay 






76-10-1801. Communications fraud — Elements — Penal-
ties. 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or 
to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false 
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and 
who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the 
purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or 
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is less than $300; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or 
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than 
$1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than 
$5,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or 
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000; and 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to 
defraud is other than the obtaining of something of monetary value. 
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall 
be measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or 
sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) 
except as provided in Subsection (l)(e). 
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the 
offense described in Subsection (1). 
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in 
Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing 
of value is not a necessary element of the offense. 
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or 
concealing a scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and 
offense of communication fraud. 
(6) (a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow, 
convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to 
talk over; or to transmit information. 
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the 
mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and 
spoken and written communication. • 
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made 
or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1801, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 157, § 2; 1990, ch. 79, § 1; 1995, 
ch. 291, § 24. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 1995, changed the value 
ranges in Subsections (l)(a) through (d) and 
deleted former Subsection (l)(f), making an 
offense involving $100,000 or more a first de-
gree felony. 
f ONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
^ OF AMERICA 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due pro-
cess of law and just compensation clauses.] 
, No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
ejection 
1, [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection.] 
% [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.] 
f. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
I, [Public debt not tb be questioned — Debts of the Confed-
eracy and claims not to be paid.] 
K5T [Power to enforce amendment.] 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 1896 
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of 
speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the 
truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall 
appear to the jury thalt the matter charged as libelous is true, 
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, 
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right 
to determine the law and the fact. 1395 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Tfue process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
sut)|ect to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
iake or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
t deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without rocess of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-;ne equal protection of the laws. 
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1 prosecutions. We needn't worry about this issue of whether 
2 I Judge Watson has jurisdiction on & felony. He does not. And 
3 that's not before this Court. 
4 THE COURT: Anything else? 
5 MR* JONES: Judge Watsqn dismissed the case for that 
6 J very reason. He said these should have been filed as 
7 I felonies• 
8 MR. PETERSON: Well— 
9 MR. JONES: He said, I'm dismissing the case, go 
10 ahead and file them as felonies. 
11 J MR. PETERSON: Very true. Very true. 
12 MR. JONES: And so what we're doing is following 
13 what he told us to do. 
14 MR. PETERSON: But that's the issue. Absolutely 
15 right, Mi4, Jones is absolutely right. And that's the issue up 
16 on appeal. An4 While that issue is pending in any way, shape 
li or form, we can't proceed. 
18 THE COURT: V^ry well. 
19 Anything further? 
20 MR. JONES: No. 
21 MR. PETERSON: No. Thank you, Judge. 
2 2 THE COURT: I believe that based upon the present 
23 status of the case in the Court of Appeals, that the very 
24 issue of whether or not the defendant can be prosecuted, 
25 either as a misdemeanor or a felony, or a single criminal 
26 
1 episode or not, that issue is before the Supreme Courts-I 
2 mean, before the Court of Appeals. 
3 Whether the defendant is using this as a ploy to 
4 delay his trial and allow him to continue doing whatever he 
5 wants to da is not an issue that makes a difference to this 
6 Court* 
7 The issue for this Court to decide is whether or not 
8 the Rules of Procedures and th£ Rules of Appellate Procedure 
9 limit what this Court is doing in this case. And I believe, 
10 from my reading of the rules, that this taatter i^ presently 
11 pending in the Court of Appeals and until the Court of Appeals 
12 issues its remittitur, that this Court is prohibited from 
13 proceeding. 
14 Based upon that, I will grant the motion in this 
15 matter to dismiss Without prejudice. This—West Valley and 
16 Salt Lake—I mean the State of Utah could then determine after 
17 the final issue is resolved whether or not you should go 
18 forward in West Valley or go forward by the State of Utah. 
19 MR. JONES: Just—just so I understand. Once we get 
20 the remittitur, we may r£-file, is that— 
21 THE COURT: You may re-file— 
22 MR. JONES: Thank you very much. 
23 THE COURT: —once the remittitur i s — 
24 MR, PETERSON: Thank you very much, your Honor. 
25 MR. JONES: Thank you, Judge. 
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1 to allow the 8355 filing to stand, 
2 THE COURT: Mr. Jones, do you want to respond to 
3 that? 
4 Mft, JONES: Well, yeah, I just—1 don't—I don't 
5 think you can. There's no question you dismissed the one case 
6 in April while we were waiting for the remittitur. Then we 
7 got word from the Court of Appeals that they were dismissing 
8 the appeal, so we went ahead and re-filed. That's the case 
9 that's still pending. 
10 And what you said at that time is, it's okay to re-
11 file, but I'm going to hold the warrant until we get a 
12 decision from the Court of Appeals, so that's essentially 
13 where we are. And if— 
14 THE COURT: And that's the position the Court is 
15 going to take in this matter. 
16 MR. JONES: Okay. 
17 THE COURT: I'm not going to dismiss any more cases, 
18 I'm not going to entertain any arguments on any cases until we 
19 have the r^esolution on the appeals resolved; so, I don't want 
20 to have cases set^in front of me again and arguments, because 
21 I'm not going to hear them until I have a remittitur back from 
22 the Court of Appeals. 
23 MR. JONES: Thanks, Judge. 
24 MR. PETERSON: That's all I have, your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: Thank you. 
Supreine Court on the issue of the writ of certiorari there* I 
take it from Mr. Jones' approach with that order, that he's 
asking the Court not to do anything• 
THE COURT: Well, I don't think I can do anything, 
Mr. Peterson* 
MR. PETERSON: Yeah. I think--* 
THE COURT: I mean, that's the argument you'ye made 
in front of me before is, is that—that since there's no 
remittitur, I can't do anything* Nowf I've got §n order from 
the Court of Appeals saying they're staying remittitur• I 
don't think I can do anything* 
MR. PETERSON: Well, that's—that's almost correct. 
Actually, the first case, Judge, before you, ending in 5698, 
we did ask you to dismiss without prejudice and you went ahead 
and did that, based on the pending appeals process—appeals 
process* So, while your Honor is correct that we've used the 
remittitur argument, we have asked you to proceed on the 
narrow issues of jurisdiction and you have done that* 
There's- a companion case, 8355, which has a 
duplicate Information filed before your Hon6r to the 
Information filed in 5698. And consistent with what the Court 
has done in the past, we would ask you to at least reach the 
issue of out motioiii to dismiss without prejudice in 8355, 
given that the appeals process is ongoing in the W£st Valley 
prosecution and therefore, this Court is without jurisdiction 
3 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
MR. PETERSON: Judger could we turn to the Richard 
Norris case, please? 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. PETERSON: Judge, did you receive a copy of the 
latest order that came down from the Court of Appeals on this? 
That's why we asked you to—to look at it now. It just seems 
to me in light of the ruling, we can't really proceed. We're 
still waiting for the remittitur. They've now stayed it while 
he goes to the U.S. Supreme Court, so... 
It looks like the Utah Supreme Court denied his 
petition on September 27th and then he went to the Court of 
Appeals and—and indicated to them that he was going to 
petition the U.S. Supreme Court. And then I got that order 
that I just gave you on the 2 9th or 30th, indicating they've 
granted another stay so it can go to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
THE COURT: Very well. 
So, I'll assume that based upon this, that if we 
don't hear something from the U.S. Supreme Court, that on 
December the 2 9th, unless there's something given to the Court 
of Appeals, that we should hear from them after December the 
29th; is that your understanding? 
MR. PETERSON: That's generally our understanding, 
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is that back on the 11th of April of 1997, you 
dismissed the case. I got down that you dismissed 
until the remittitur arrived. 
MR. PETERSON: Well, when he says "the 
case," I assume that's referring to 8355? 
MR. JONES: I think SO. 
THE COURT: There was a motion to dismiss 
on this matter made on the 11th of — the 19th of 
November, and I rejected that request and said, "That 
the Court denies defense motion to dismiss, will 
entertain no further motions, hearings or arguments 
until the remittitur from the Court of Appeals." 
MR. PETERSON: Right. And, Judge, as 
I've corrected on the docket twice now, you didn't 
rule legally one way or another on our motion to 
dismiss. You simply said, T m not going to rule on 
any motions until we have the appellate court process 
run its course." 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. PETERSON: So there hasn't been any 
formal ruling one way or another on the motion to 
dismiss with prejudice in 5698, and there hasn't been 
any rulings at all on any motion to dismiss on 8355. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. PETERSON: Except for the ruling that 
Page 1 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 THE COURT: Ready on the Norris matter? 
3 This is on for the Defendant's motion to 
4 dismiss this matter? 
5 This is Case No. 9 8 - I mean, 978008355. 
6 Now, Case No. 978008355 has been 
7 dismissed; correct? 
8 MR. PETERSON: Judge, it has been 
9 dismissed on a motion that I made; however, 
10 Mr. Norris subsequently filed a pro se motion to 
11 dismiss with prejudice -
12 THE COURT: That's on the Case No. 5698? 
13 MR. PETERSON: Correct. At which point 
14 you considered his special motion to dismiss with 
15 prejudice and for reappointment of counsel. You 
16 granted his motion reappointing counsel on the narrow 
17 issue of whether the case should be dismissed with 
18 prejudice. So our posture on 5698 is: Should that 
19 matter be dismissed with prejudice? 
20 Our posture on 8355 is: Should the case 
21 be dismissed? And then should it likewise be 
22 dismissed with prejudice? 
23 THE COURT: All right. That's your 
24 understanding, Mr. Jones? 
25 MR. JONES: Yeah, I guess. What I show 
BILLIE WAY, CCT 801-364-4943 
Page 3 
1 you wouldn't rule until the appellate court ran its 
2 course. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. Very well. Let's 
4 proceed. 
5 MR. PETERSON: Thank you, Judge. 
6 Your Honor, would it be all right if I 
7 proceed from counsel table here. I have got a lot of 
8 materials to spread out. 
9 Judge, first, I guess, in order of 
10 procedural tidiness, we've got 5698, which was the 
11 first of the filings before you, and that's the 
12 subject of -
13 THE COURT: That's not a filing. That's 
14 not Judge Palmer's case? 
15 MR. PETERSON: No, Judge, that's not 
16 Judge Palmer's. That is the case filed immediately 
17 after Judge Palmer's was dismissed. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. 
19 MR. PETERSON: And that is the case that 
20 you granted Mr. Norris the special right to reopen 
21 the issue about dismissal with prejudice. You have 
22 already dismissed the case without prejudice. The 
23 reason you dismissed it without prejudice was the 
24 filing in 5698 occurred before the remittitur from 
25 the Utah Court of Appeals had come back in the case 
Page 1 - Page 3 
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1 of West Valley City v. Richard Norris. 
! 2 Mr. Norrisf request to have the cas& 
3 dismissed with prejudice has three bases: Number 
4 one, Mr. Norris filed a pro se memorandum, asking you 
5 to dismiss it because of what he outlined in his 
6 Memorandum as what he termed prosecutorial 
7 vindictiveness. And then I subsequently supplemented 
8 his memorandum with a letter dated June 3, 1997, 
9 which is in your file, and I attached copies of the 
10 Der and the DeMarco Cases (phonetic) to supplement 
11 Mr. Norrisf pro se filing. 
12 Your Honor, the gist of the argument here 
13 that Mr. Norris advanced in his Memorandum and that 
14 I've supplemented with the Der and DeMarco Cases is 
15 that he had been subjected to the prosecutorial 
16 vindictiveness because the Judge Palmer filing in 
17 downtown court, a filing that was a duplicate of the 
18 West Valley case with Judge Watson, was filed when 
19 Mr. Norrisf appeal was still pending. And everybody, 
20 knew that the appeal was still pending, and so they 
21 ought not to have gone forward with a duplicate 
22 filing. The West Valley case was before the Utah 
i23 Court of Appeals. 
24 Now, the prejudice here is that 
25 Mr. Norris was, in fact, served with a new criminal 
PageS 
1 information, Judge; he was, in fact, incarcerated on 
2 that new filing while the appeal was pending. 
3 THE COURT: And I dismissed it based upon 
4 his motion. 
5 THE COURT: Judge, I'm talking about 
6 Judge Palmer's case that you never dealt with. He 
7 spent three weeks in jail in the Judge Palmer case 
8 before he posted $40,000 in bail and got out. That 
9 case was subsequently dismissed. Judge Palmer 
10 dismissed that matter saying, "State, don't be filing 
11 actions when there is an appeal in the same case out 
12 of West Valley pending." 
13 All right. Now, Judge Palmer's case was 
14 dismissed. Your case, your first case is filed; 
15 that's 5698. Once again, Mr. Norris is 
16 incarcerated. I filed a motion to dismiss because 
17 the West Valley appeal is still pending even the 
18 second time that the downtown case is filed. You 
19 look at the matter and say, "Sure enough. We don't 
20 have a remittitur in the case. The State is on 
21 notice that remittitur is what turns an appellate 
22 case back to a state court, and therefore this case 
23 will have to be dismissed. 
24 All right. Unfortunately, Mr. Norris had 
25 another week — roughly a little over a week in jail 
Page 6 
1 because of a subsequent filing. 
2 So we have filings in the downtown Third 
3 District Court that are essentially duplicates of a 
4 West Valley case on appeal that keep landing my 
5 client in jail. And he does a whole month of jail 
6 time in a case that both Your Honor and Judge Palmer 
7 did not hesitate to dismiss once the motions to 
8 dismiss were filed. 
9 And, you know, Judge, Mr. Norris1 pro se 
10 memorandum, my reference to the Der and DeMarco Case 
11 lays out an analysis that obligates the State to a 
12 higher standard. They know the appellate procedure, 
13 they know the West Valley case is pending and yet the 
14 man is jailed for an additional month on essentially 
15 duplicate filings. 
16 So the long and the short of it is: 
17 There's that prejudice, there's that vindictiveness 
18 in the proceedings and Mr. Norris' pro se memorandum 
19 sets forth the relief there, which would be a 
20 dismissal with prejudice Under those circumstances. 
21 The second basis, Judge, for the 
22 dismissal with prejudice in Case 5698 is, I think, 
23 really the heart of what we are discussing here 
24 today, an it's got a little bit of a procedural 
25 involvement to it, Judge. I filed the memorandum 
I Page 7 
1 dated July 1st, 19 (Inaudible) so that the Court and 
2 Mr. Jones know what I'm referring to. It's entitled 
3 Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
4 Dismiss with Prejudice. The argument there, Judge, 
5 is that an expungement order was in place. After 
6 Judge Palmer's case had been dismissed, Your Honor, 
7 there had been an expungement order sought by 
8 Mr. Norris' and subsequently signed. 
9 Now, I need to make a correction on the 
10 record, Judge. It was signed by Mr. Judge Hilder, 
11 and it was not signed by Judge Palmer as indicated in 
12 my memorandum. And I correct that typo. But the 
13 point being that the expungement order was signed by 
14 Judge Hilder, and the effect of the expungement order 
15 under the statute is that all records of the 
16 investigation, arrest and detention of an individual 
17 are are expunged and are sealed and cannot be used 
18 for any further purposes. And I cite and attach the 
19 case of Ambis v. Utah State Board of Education 
20 (phonetic) to my memorandum which holds exactly 
21 that. The police records, hospital records and 
22 witness testimony in that case, once an expungement 
23 order had been executed, were sealed and were not 
24 available for any use in any prosecution or any other 
25 court action. 
5 
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J 1 So, Judge, there is an expungement order 
2 in effect. Judge Hilder signed the expungement 
3 order. Those records are sealed. They can't form 
4 the basis for any additional affiant in a probable 
5 cause statement of an information to go forward with 
6 any additional criminal filings. And that order has 
7 not been overturned. In other words, as we stand 
8 here today, Your Honor, Judge Hilder1 s order stands. 
9 It's never been appealed by the State. It's never 
10 been an issue of a motion for rehearing before Judge 
11 Hilder to seek that the order be overturned. 
12 In Mr. Jonesf reply memorandum, Your 
13 Honor, on this expungement issue, the argument is 
14 made on the bottom of Page 3 and I quote: 
15 "The expungement order should 
16 not have been granted." 
17 That's the State's rationale for why you 
18 ought not to abide by i t But it is an order entered 
19 by the Court of a competent and coequal jurisdiction 
20 to your own. And I submit, Judge, what we have on 
21 our hands is, in essence, a variation of a Brickey 
22 issue. As you are aware, in the standard Brickey 
23 analysis if a case goes to some form of hearing, in 
24 this case in an expungement case an ex parte hearing, 
25 and an order is signed by a Judge, the way you look 
| Page 9 
1 at analyzing whether the order ought to be overturned 
2 or in some other way altered is you take that issue 
3 back to the Judge that issued the order. 
4 Now, this isn't a procedural snafu that 
5 Mr. Jones and I have discussed before today, and, 
6 frankly, this concept of the Brickey analysis was 
7 just coming to me while I was eating lunch today, but 
8 the point is this, Judge: The State is asking you to 
9 override Judge Hilder rs expungement order when they 
10 ask you to ignore it, when they argue, "It should 
11 never have been granted.11 
12 THE COURT: I don't have a copy of an 
13 expungement order, either. 
14 MR. PETERSON: It is attached, Your 
15 Honor, to the supplemental memorandum. And I111 
16 provide you with my copy of that so you can look at 
17 i t 
18 Your Honor, may I approach. 
19 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
20 MR. PETERSON: (Handing). What I've 
121 attached is Exhibit B to my initial memorandum is the 
22 Judge Hilderfs January 27th, 1997, expungement order 
|23 sealing all records. 
24 THE COURT: Well, that doesn't apply to 
25 either of these two cases, though. This is a third 
Page 10 
1 case. 
2 MR. PETERSON: Judge, the expungement 
3 order certainly has its own individual case number, 
4 but the records that are sealed by that expungement 
5 order, as indicated in the memorandum and 
6 attachments, are the records that underpin the Judge 
7 Palmer probable cause filing. Once the Judge Palmer 
8 case has been dismissed, Mr. Norris sought 
9 expungement of that particular case that had just 
10 been dismissed. Now, the statute allows an 
11 individual to have a case that's been dismissed 
12 expunged, and that's exactly what Mr. Norris did. 
13 Mr. Jones argues that he didn't either follow the 
14 right procedure or that Judge Hilder didn't have the 
15 right information before him to sign the order, but 
16 the order is in place. And what I'm submitting to 
17 you, Judge, is since the records that were sealed are 
18 the basis for the probable cause underpinning the 
19 Judge Palmer filing and two subsequent filings in 
20 your case, the Judge that needs to take a look at 
21 lifting the expungement order is Judge Hilder unless 
22 you believe you're able to sit in a capacity to 
23 review and potentially overturn your colleague's 
24 order. And that's why it's a Brickey issue. 
25 THE COURT: I guess, you can sit this in 
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1 front of Judge Hilder and have him look at this. 
2 MR. PETERSON: I guess we could. 
3 THE COURT: And he could say that we have 
4 a statement here supposedly made under oath by 
5 Mr. Norris that appears not to be true. 
6 MR. PETERSON: We can certainly do that 
j 7 if there were either an order from Your Honor 
I 8 transferring these issues to Judge Hilder or a 
9 special petition by the State to reopen that issue 
10 with Judge Hilder. But to date we don't have either 
II of those filings or orders. 
12 But, Judge, my point is: The expungement 
13 statute has been complied with. There is an 
14 expungement in place. And if the State wants it 
115 overturned, they either have to go on direct appeal 
16 to a higher court or go back before Judge Hilder on a 
17 special petition to have it overridden. 
18 Now, Your Honor, the third basis for the 
19 motion to dismiss is that this particular 
20 Communications Fraud statute is unconstitutional on 
21 its face. And I have elaborated in detail — 
22 THE COURT: I have read through that 
23 previously. You don't have to argue that. 
24 MR. PETERSON: Right. I will make one 
25 rebuttal point about it once Mr. Jones has touched on 
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! 1 that issue. 
2 MR. JONES: Judge, I think the issue here 
3 is pretty simple, and I think the statute that we 
4 cited in our supplemental memorandum is right on 
5 point. The question, I think, is whether the State 
6 is entitled to refile charges that have been 
7 dismissed. In this case they have been dismissed on 
8 two prior occasions. 
9 I cited to the Court Rule 7 of the Utah 
10 Rules of Criminal Procedure, and it's Section 7, 
11 Subparagraph H3, where it says: 
12 nThe dismissal and discharge in 
13 a preliminary hearing do not preclude 
14 the State from instituting a 
15 subsequent prosecution for the same 
16 offense." 
17 And I really think that's the situation 
18 we are dealing with here. And I'm not sure it's 
19 necessary to talk about all of the reasoning by Judge 
20 Palmer or yourself when you dismissed this because 
21 the remittitur was not here. I think the statute is 
22 fairly clear that we are entitled to refile criminal 
23 charges under Rule 7H3. If you want I'll be glad 
24 to -
25 THE COURT: what about their argument 
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1 that since this was expunged, that you can't do 
2 anything? 
3 MR. JONES: Well, Judge, the reason that 
4 I don't think the expungement statute applies is 
5 expungement deals with the arrest records. What he 
6 was doing there is expunging his arrest record. That 
7 does not preclude, and it is certainly not 
8 appropriate as a method to preclude, the State from 
9 refiling. If it were, then why would we have Rule 
10 7H3 which says specifically that the State may refile 
11 charges? So, I mean, if the expungement statute is 
12 there and designed to preclude us from ever refiling, 
13 every defendant who prevailed in a preliminary 
14 hearing would simply file for an expungement. If you 
15 look at the expungement statute, it has to do with 
16 his arrest record, or there is another section that 
17 deals with expunging convictions. But the 
18 expungement statute is not designed to prevent us 
19 from refiling criminal charges. It simply prevents 
20 us — or expunges his record as to a particular 
21 arrest in this case. And that's why we didn't bother 
22 to ever challenge his expungement petition, because 
23 as I read it, it doesn't preclude us from refiling 
24 criminal charges. 
25 As we outlined in our initial memorandum, 
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1 it is our position that he lied in order to get those 
2 records expunged. I mean, one of the paragraphs in 
3 his petition, Paragraph 7, he claims that there were 
4 no charges pending and no investigation being 
5 instituted when, in fact, at the time that he files 
6 his petition this case, or at least the subject 
7 matter of this case, was on appeal to the Court of 
8 Appeals. He knew that, and yet he goes ahead and 
9 files his petition. Under 77-18-12 it specifically 
10 provides that you cannot have your records expunged 
II if, in fact, there are charges pending or an 
12 investigation pending, and that's exactly what 
13 happened? 
14 THE COURT: Well, in this matter here it 
15 seems to me that it is clear that the petition filed 
16 by Mr. Norris in this matter, all he asked is to 
17 expunge his arrest and detention records. It doesn't 
18 say anything else about it. 
19 MR. JONES: That's right. And I don't 
20 think the expungement record really means anything as 
21 far as the method or means to preclude us from 
22 refiling criminal charges. 
23 THE COURT: I don't understand what 
24 section of the Code he's talking about (Inaudible) 
25 77-18 (Inaudible) cited all through this whole thing 
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j 1 has been repealed and has been repealed since 1994. 
2 MR. JONES: Right. I would simply just 
3 ask the Court to allow us to refile based on Rule 7 
4 and deny the motion. 
5 THE COURT: Mr. Peterson. 
6 MR. PETERSON: Thank you, Your Honor. We 
7 refer to 77-18-1 eq seq and particularly the 
8 definition contained at 77-18-9 where it says that, 
9 "Expungement means the sealing or destruction of a 
10 criminal record and including records of all 
11 investigation, arrests, detention or conviction." 
12 All records of investigation, Judge. 
13 THE COURT: Yes, that may be true, but he 
14 didn't ask for that. All he asked for was his 
15 detention records to be expunged, and that's 
16 (Inaudible) How can you argue that the State has an 
17 obligation to oppose something that he's not even 
18 asking for? 
19 MR. PETERSON: Judge, my opinion of Judge 
20 Hilder's expungement order is that he did, in fact, 
21 seal consistent with the definition of expungement 
22 under Subsection 9, that he did seal all of the 
23 criminal record and investigation and arrest and 
24 detention records. 
25 Now, everything that Mr. Jones says in 
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1 rebuttal may , in fact, be true, bu t these are 
2 arguments that need to be submitted to the court that 
3 issued the expungement order. 
4 THE COURT: No, I don ' t think so. I 
5 think you can read through the request that — 
6 MR. PETERSON: Judge, m a y I retrieve m y 
7 memorandum because obviously I can ' t (Inaudible). 
8 THE COURT: I don ' t k n o w why w e don ' t 
9 have copies of those things in the file. 
TO MR. PETERSON: Judge, specifically, 
11 Subparagraph 1 of Judge Hi lder ' s January 21st, ' 97 , 
12 order reads that, "All records in Petit ioner 's case 
13 in this court or any other court of this county shall 
14 be expunged and sealed." A n d we are dealing with all 
\ 15 records under the Code including any records of 
116 investigation that wou ld form the basis for the 
17 probable cause statement. 
118 THE COURT: I understand your argument, 
19 but I a m saying if you read Mr. Nor r i s ' request to 
20 h im and the request that he sends to the prosecutor, 
21 he asks for the expungement of his arrest and 
22 detention records. I mean, I don ' t think he ' s 
23 entitled to any more than what he ' s asked for. So 
24 I ' l l deny your motion. 
25 MR. PETERSON: Well, Judge, I 
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1 u n d e r s t a n d - I guess that you have ruled on this 
2 issue. But I want to be clear for any appellate 
3 record that Judge Hi lder ' s order is using definition 
4 of expungement found at 77-18-9, Subsection 5. 
5 THE COURT: (Inaudible) argue that. You 
6 can say that 's what it says. You can argue that 
7 that's what it should say, but I don't think I'm 
8 going to stand here and interpret what Judge Hi lder ' s 
9 signed and what the statute says. It is not for m e 
10 to decide. 
11 MR. PETERSON: Well, it would be 
12 something for Judge Hilder to decide, however, and 
13 tha t ' s why it becomes a delicate Brickey issue. I 
14 mean, there are fine-tuned rulings that are made , for 
15 example, at prel iminary hearing that only the Judge 
16 sitting in those proceedings can revisit. A n d this 
17 is one such ruling that needs a revisiting in m y 
118 opinion. Because the statute is clear, the 
19 legislature has defined that when an expungement 
20 order is issued here is what is covered. I t ' s 
21 categorical and it is black and white. A n 
22 expungement order has been signed, and all records 
23 under 77-18-9, Subsection 5 are covered b y vir tue of 
24 the statutory definition once the expungement order 
25 is issued. 
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1 THE COURT: But your argument doesn ' t 
2 make any difference what the person says. He doesn ' t 
3 mark down that he wants the records expunged. He 
4 only wants the arrest records taken care of. And 
5 that therefore because he d idn ' t ask for it, the 
6 State d idn ' t object to it, they are bound for 
7 something that he didn ' t even ask for? 
8 MR. PETERSON: Judge, if we review ~ 
9 THE COURT: Is that what you are saying? 
10 MR. PETERSON: Judge, jus t one moment . 
11 If we jus t review... Your Honor, wha t ' s marked in the 
12 Petit ioner 's Petition for Expungement as seen in the 
13 records is Subsection 6, "expunging all of the 
14 arrests, detention records." 
15 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
16 MR. PETERSON: All of the records 
17 pertaining -
18 THE COURT: (Inaudible). 
19 MR. PETERSON: Pertaining to Mr. Nor r i s ' 
20 arrest are exactly the records referred to in the 
21 definition of expungement. Al l of the records of 
22 investigation that led up to that arrest, all of the 
23 records underpinning probable cause in the arrest. 
24 Arrest records, in short, is anything having to do 
25 with what led up to that arrest. A n d our position -
Page 19 
1 THE COURT: (Inaudible). 
2 MR. PETERSON: Well, I am not coming up 
3 with this. The legislature defined expungement quite 
4 clearly so that we wouldn ' t be in this box. And 
5 Judge Hilder has signed an expungement order. So I 
6 think we are treading on some thin ice and some 
7 delicate ground without having Judge Hilder revisit 
8 the issue and tell us what he believes the scope of 
9 the order that he signed was and whether it ought to 
10 be an order that should be revisited and perhaps 
11 withdrawn. I mean, I think there are some very 
12 serious due process issues that creep in n o w under a 
13 Brickey analysis. 
14 THE COURT: Underneath Subsection 9, it 
15 says: "Expungement means the sealing or destruction 
16 of a criminal record including records of 
17 investigation restitution or conviction" (Inaudible). 
18 MR. PETERSON: Right. 
19 THE COURT: It seems to m e it can be any 
20 one of those or something else. It doesn ' t have to 
21 mean all of those. 
22 MR. PETERSON: Right. A n d m y point is 
23 that this order is broad enough that when it says 
24 "records of arrest," it can include records 
25 supporting probable cause that led to the arrest; 
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1 In any event, Judge, it just seems to me 
2 that if it is an order imposed b y a coequal court or 
| 3 of coequal jur isdict ion, perhaps that Judge ought to 
j 4 be looking at this issue, and I wan t to m a k e this 
5 Court aware that I believe that would be the 
6 procedural ly proper thing to do even if w e end up 
7 wi th exact ly the same result , that the mot ion to 
8 dismiss is denied on the basis of the expungement 
9 statute. 
10 THE COURT: (Inaudible). 
11 MR. PETERSON: Now, Judge, in response to 
12 Mr . Jones ' response, he argues that 7H(3) , the 
13 Sta te ' s right to refile, somehow covers everything. 
14 Well , w e haven ' t addressed the issue of the 
15 consti tutionali ty of the statute. Certainly, the 
16 State doesn ' t have the right to refile if a mot ion to 
17 dismiss wi th prejudice is granted. They only have 
18 the right to refile if it's a motion ~ if it is a 
19 dismissal wi thout prejudice. W e also don ' t have any 
20 response from Mr . Jones about the p ro se arguments of 
21 Mr . Norr i s on vindict iveness and the ja i l ing of h i m 
22 twice and the one mon th in ja i l when both Your Honor 
j 23 and Judge Palmer dismissed those actions saying, 
24 "Wait a minute . Appea l s are pending. D o n ' t be 
25 doing this." A n d the State is silent on those issues 
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1 as far as I can tell here. 
2 THE COURT: Mr. Jones. 
3 MR. JONES: Well, Judge, I can respond. 
4 This is not a case of vindict iveness at all on the 
5 Prosecution's part. If you look, initially, we 
6 outl ined our first m e m o r a n d u m of h o w this case came 
7 into play. Originally the West Val ley Police were 
8 told b y Judge Watson that these charges needed to be 
9 filed as felonies. He dismissed the case out there, 
10 and that ' s the one that went up on appeal. A n d so 
11 the police came to our office and said, "We have been 
12 told b y Judge Watson that these charges involving 
13 Communica t ions Fraud should be filed as felonies. W e 
14 filed those." 
15 When we got in front of Judge Palmer , he 
16 m a d e it clear that he w a s going to quash the 
17 information because the appeal was still pending. 
18 But he also said that once the appeal was over, then 
19 w e could go ahead and refile. A n d w e were notified 
20 b y the Court of Appeals that the appeal had been 
21 dismissed and that w e were then free to go ahead and 
22 file. So there 's nothing vindictive. W e had 
23 instructions from Judge Palmer at that t ime saying, 
24 "You can go ahead and refile this case once the 
25 appeal has been dismissed," and tha t ' s wha t w e did. 
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1 A n d then the next t ime it came u p , of course, was in 
2 front of Your Honor where w e had refiled the charges, 
3 but w e had not received the remitt i tur. A n d you said 
4 essentially the same thing, " I ' m going to dismiss the 
5 case but y o u can refile once you get the 
6 remittitur." 
7 So w e are s imply following instructions 
8 that have been given to us b y two different Judges 
9 saying, "You can file these charges once the appeal 
10 is over or once the remit t i tur comes back." So this 
11 is not a situation where w e are being vindict ive. W e 
12 are s imply following the instructions of the Court . 
13 A n d tha t ' s w h y we never bothered to respond to the 
14 expungement request because in reali ty w e have got 
15 instructions from two different Judges telling us 
16 when and under what conditions or circumstances w e 
17 can go ahead and refile. 
18 THE COURT: (Inaudible) I ' l l deny the 
19 mot ion to dismiss wi th prejudice in the Case N o . 
20 5698. The case has been dismissed. In Case N o . 
21 971008355 , I ' l l deny your mot ion to dismiss in that 
22 matter , as well . 
23 MR. PETERSON: Judge, there are separate 
24 issues in 8355 relative to the dismissal without 
25 prejudice. And , by the way , m a y I approach, Judge? 
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1 I do have — when you handed me back my expungement 
2 memo, you also handed me the initial memo I filed 
| 3 (Handing). 
4 Your Honor, by point of clarification, I 
j 5 take it your ruling is that the statute is not 
6 unconstitutional? 
7 THE COURT: On the vagueness matter? 
8 MR. PETERSON: Right. 
9 THE COURT: Yes. 
10 MR. PETERSON: okay. Judge, did you want 
11 to entertain any argument at all on that issue do you 
12 think? 
13 THE COURT: No, I believe it 's outlined 
14 clearly by both sides in the memorandums, and I have 
15 read through that, and I believe that the State's 
16 position is correct. 
17 MR. PETERSON: okay. I would point out 
18 then, again, for purposes of appeal that the State's 
19 example at the end of their memorandum on Pages 3 and 
20 4 is an example that clearly displays why the statute 
21 it unconstitutional. Mr. Jones cites a case where if 
22 you have communications with ten people and in each 
23 of those communications you obtain a hundred dollars 
24 each, then you have ten separate acts of 
25 Communications Fraud. 
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1 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
2 MR. PETERSON: But y o u also have a felony 
3 because first y o u count them ten t imes and then you 
4 aggregate it. Well, you can't have it both ways, 
5 Judge. The statute either has to allow an 
6 aggregation of the s u m of a thousand dollars in order 
7 to get you a felony level scheme or it has to break 
8 it down as ten separate mi sdemeanor offenses at a 
9 hundred dollars each. And the very — the very 
10 example that Mr. Jones articulates is the one that 
11 points most clearly to why the statute is facially 
112 unconstitutional. 
13 And, procedurally, Judge, let's be clear 
14 where this case came from: Keith Stoney (phonetic) 
j 15 was Prosecutor in West Valley City that brought the 
!l6 action. And he said to Judge Watson, "Judge, I get 
17 to file ten separate misdemeanors if they are each a 
18 hundred dollar communications," and Judge Watson 
19 said, "No, you have to aggregate it as one felony." 
20 Mr. Stoney filed an appeal saying, "No, no no. Every 
21 separate" — 
22 THE COURT: (Inaudible) that appeal w a s 
23 dismissed. 
24 MR. PETERSON: I unders tand. l a m 
25 telling you what he briefed. "Every separate 
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1 communication is a separate misdemeanor." That's how 
2 strongly the State felt in Judge Watson's court. 
3 THE COURT: (Inaudible) Mr . Stoney. 
4 MR. PETERSON: I unders tand . Bu t the 
5 point is Judge Watson in that case, in a case that is 
6 sort of coequal law of the case, ruled it's one or 
7 another. Ei ther y o u aggregate it as a single felony 
8 offense or y o u have ten separate mi sdemeanor s at a 
9 hundred dollars each. And he dismissed the case and 
10 said, "Go refile as one felony." 
11 Well, Mr. Jones' example is: You either 
12 have the ten misdemeanors at a hundred or you have 
13 one felony at a thousand. But you don't have ten 
14 separate felonies because somehow the ten 
15 communcations added up to 1,000. That's his argument 
16 here. 
17 THE COURT: The statute says , "Each 
18 separate communication is a separate act or offense." 
19 MR. PETERSON: It does. 
20 THE COURT: That ' s quot ing f rom your 
21 (Inaudible) . 
122 MR. PETERSON: Well, t ha t ' s wha t the 
23 statute says. 
24 THE COURT: And the other par t of the 
25 statute says that the determination of the degree of 
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1 any offense shall be measured by the total value of 
2 things to be obtained b y the scheme, and the scheme 
j 3 is all of these separate communica t ions . 
! 4 MR. PETERSON: Right. 
5 THE COURT: That is the interpretation 
6 that's been given. 
7 MR. PETERSON: Right. 
8 THE COURT: And therefore if the total 
9 amount is a felony, then each one of these separate 
10 communications is also a felony. 
11 MR. PETERSON: And y o u are saying that 
12 that's constitutional on its face? 
13 THE COURT: Right. 
14 MR. PETERSON: I see. 
15 THE COURT: Anything further? 
16 MR. JONES: I think the next thing is w e 
17 need set a p re l im if we can. 
18 MR. PETERSON: Well, Judge, w e do have 
19 the dismissal on Case 8355 with and without 
20 prejudice. I know you've ruled that with prejudice 
21 won't be granted because the expungement doesn't bar, 
22 the statute is const i tut ional and the vindict iveness 
23 hasn't been shown. But in 8355 we have the same 
24 basis for a dismissal in the case that we have in 
25 5698, that is an appeal is pending. It's simply that 
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1 in 8355 -
2 THE COURT: The appeal is no t pending 
3 anymore in this case. 
4 MR. PETERSON: It is not anymore and so 
5 it can be filed now. 
6 THE COURT: (Inaudible) filed, okay? It 
7 is filed effective this date, is that what you are 
j 8 saying? 
j 9 MR. PETERSON: Well, if that's what you'd 
110 like to rule . Bu t the appeal w a s pending when 8355 
111 was filed. 
12 THE COURT: And so wha t are you saying? 
13 MR. PETERSON: Well, I 'm saying that, you 
j 14 know, it wasn't properly filed because the appeal was 
115 still underway at the time. And the appeal process 
16 has run its course, the matter can be filed. But it 
17 couldn't on the date 8355 was actually filed. 
18 THE COURT: I t 's proper ly before m e now; 
19 is it not? 
20 MR. JONES: if the State files it as of 
21 today. 
22 MR. JONES: We filed back i n M a y 22nd of 
23 1997,1 believe. That's the latest one. And what 
24 happened was we filed it and the Court said, "You can 
25 file the information, but we'll take it under 
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[ 1 advisement for the time being until the appeal is 
I 2 resolved." 
3 THE COURT: Well, it's filed when it is 
4 filed. The appeal has been resolved. I believe it's 
5 properly before the Court. 
6 MR. PETERSON: Judge, as of what 
7 effective date is it properly before the Court? 
8 Because when it was filed, the appeal was still 
9 pending in the West Valley case. And you dismissed 
10 5698 for that singular reason. You said, "Don't be 
II filing anything until the appeals are done." 8355 was 
12 filed before the appeals were done. 
13 THE COURT: Well (Inaudible). 
14 MR. JONES: Let's be clear, Judge. What 
15 you said was that we couldn't file until the 
16 remittitur came back. Once we got the remittitur 
17 back, that's when we filed this latest case in May of 
18 '97. My recollection is that as soon as we filed, 
19 then Mr. Norris turned around and petitioned to the 
J20 U.S. Supreme Court. 
|21 THE COURT: I don't think there's 
22 anything that says that they can't file an 
123 information. I think that if there is an issue 
24 concerning whether or not it is properly before the 
25 Court because of an appeal, there may be hearings on 
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1 that that can be stayed. I think that's what I said, 
2 that I am not going to dismiss this or entertain any 
3 further motions until the remittitur is received. 
4 The remittitur has been received, so I think it's 
5 properly before the Court. I don't think there's 
6 anything that says they can't file it. Therefore 
7 it's properly before the Court. 
8 MR. PETERSON: Well, Judge, what we had 
9 briefed the first time you issued your order 
10 dismissing the case was the concept that you can't 
11 file one set of charges when that same set of charges 
12 is pending a duplicate filing on appeal. And so you 
13 didn't have hesitation dismissing 5698 on that basis 
14 on essentially a double-jeopardy analysis basis. And 
15 the same thing applies in 8355, there was a 
16 remittitur from our State Supreme Court, a subsequent 
17 filing with the U.S. Supreme Court in West Valley v. 
18 Norris, and the case was still on active appeal until 
19 the United States Supreme Court issued its denial and 
20 remittitur. Once that occurs, then clearly West 
21 Valley v. Norris is over and 8355 can be filed. But 
22 the law we cited in our initial motion to dismiss 
23 which you granted is that you cannot have duplicate 
24 filings with the same charges when the first case is 
25 on appeal. 
Page 30 
1 THE COURT: Well, Mr. Jones, do you want 
2 to say anything? 
3 MR. JONES: Well, Judge, in our 
4 memorandum we have outlined the factual scenario that 
5 took place here, and what I have down on our second 
6 page, Number 7, Paragraph No. 7, is on April 11th, 
7 1997, you dismissed the felony charges because the 
8 remittitur had not been issued by the Court of 
9 Appeals. You advised the parties that charges could 
10 be filed once the remittitur arrived from the Court 
11 of Appeals. A month later in May of'97 the District 
12 Attorney's Office received the remittitur from the 
13 Court of Appeals and filed felony charges. Those 
14 charges are currently pending, but Your Honor had 
15 recalled the arrest warrant until the motion to 
16 dismiss could be resolved. The Defendant has filed a 
17 motion to dismiss the case with prejudice. That's 
18 the one we just argued (Inaudible). 
19 So it just seems to me that there's no 
20 question we can file the charges. We have done 
21 that. The remittitur came back. What stopped us 
22 after that point in time in May of '97 is that he 
23 then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to put us back 
24 on hold. Because even though the remittitur had been 
25 issued, they recalled the remittitur later on because 
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1 his case had gone up on appeal to the U.S. Supreme 
I 2 Court. 
3 THE COURT: okay. The remittitur was 
4 issued and (Inaudible) in May 15th. May 15th and 
5 that's the date this case was filed. 
6 MR. JONES: Right. That is the date the 
7 warrant was signed (Inaudible). 
8 THE COURT: That's (Inaudible). I'll set 
9 this matter for preliminary hearing at this time? 
10 MR. JONES: That would be fine. 
11 THE COURT: How much time do we need to 
12 do this? 
13 MR. JONES: Judge, I think we probably 
14 ought to have a special setting if we can. We 
15 probably got anywhere between eight and ten 
16 witnesses. It shouldn't take longer than 
17 (Inaudible). 
18 THE COURT: February the 3rd? 
19 MR. JONES: That's fine with the State. 
20 THE COURT: 10:00 o'clock? 
21 MR. PETERSON: Excuse me, Judge, what -
22 which day of the week is that? 
23 THE COURT: Wednesday. 
24 MR. PETERSON: That will be fine. Did 
25 you say 9:00 o'clock? 
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1 THE COURT: 10:00 o'clock. 
2 MR. PETERSON: 10:00 o'clock. That would 
3 be here? 
4 THE COURT: It's a special setting. If 
5 for some reason you are not going to go, please 
6 notify the Court. 
7 MR. JONES: Judge, the only other 
8 question, I guess, to resolve is the question 
9 involving the warrant of arrest that was issued. As 
10 I recall, Judge Reece recalled the warrant until we 
11 resolved these issues involving the motion to 
12 dismiss. I would simply ask the Court to allow us to 
13 activate the warrant, go ahead and have it served. 
14 THE COURT: He'll just be booked and 
15 released? 
16 MR. JONES: Well, if I might, Judge, 
17 since this case was filed in May of 1997, this 
18 Defendant has been charged in at least four 
19 additional cases. And I just think that he's a real 
20 threat to the community and we should certainly be 
21 entitled to serve the warrant and have him booked on 
22 the case. He's pending Communications Fraud cases or 
23 charges down in Utah County. He was convicted up in 
24 Davis County on Child Abuse. He had two cases 
25 pending here in Salt Lake within the last year 
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1 involving criminal mischief and violations of a 
2 protective order. And I think primarily because of 
3 his arrest record it's not inappropriate at least to 
4 have a warrant served and have him booked. 
5 THE COURT: I think he should be booked 
6 and then he can be released. 
7 MR. PETERSON: Judge, to simplify the 
8 matter, the statute does allow under Rule 6 for a 
9 simple appearance by summons. And I would ask the 
10 Court to look at doing that simply because Mr. Norris 
11 has made all court dates in this matter and in every 
12 other matter that was ever filed. And I did 
13 represent him in one previous — in one supplemental 
14 downtown case with Mr. Jones where he made all 
15 appearances before Judge McCleve. The case was 
16 ultimately resolved and dismissed. And he's not 
17 involved in any ongoing artifice or scheme in this 
18 case or in the case that Mr. Grey of the Attorney 
19 General's Office has filed. 
20 THE COURT: He's never been actually 
21 booked on this case; has he? 
22 MR. JONES: That's right. 
23 THE COURT: Doesn't the statute say he 
24 has to have some sort of booking on felony charges? 
25 MR. PETERSON: Well, he has, in fact, 
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1 been previously booked and held for three weeks in 
2 the Judge Palmer matter, booked and held an 
3 additional over one week in your case, 5698. 
I 4 MR. JONES: But he had that expunged, so 
J 5 there is no record of it. 
J 6 MR. PETERSON: He doesn't have 5698 
; 7 expunged. That still stands. 
8 THE COURT: He has been booked on 5698, 
9 and he doesn't need to be booked again on it. 
10 MR. PETERSON: That's our position. 
II THE COURT: Well, he has to be. He has 
12 to be. 
13 MR. PETERSON: That's what I say--
14 THE COURT: They say he has been and you 
15 say he hasn't been. 
16 MR. PETERSON: Well, he has been on 5698, 
17 and it has not been expunged. Mr. Jones doesn't 
18 contest that. 
19 MR. JONES: Right. What I am saying is: 
20 It is not a question of his appearance. It is a 
21 question of him being a threat to the community. 
22 What I've outlined to the Court are incidents where 
23 he's been arrested or charged with new crimes, and 
24 that's our concern and the reason why we are asking 
25 the Court to activate the warrant and that he booked 
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1 in on this. 
2 THE COURT: I deny the request. 
3 MR. JONES: What do you want to do with 
4 the arrest warrant, then, Judge? 
5 THE COURT: Well, he's already been 
6 booked on it. 
J 7 MR. JONES: He has not been booked on 
| 8 this case. 
| 9 THE COURT: You just told me he has -
110 MR. PETERSON: On 5698 he has. 
11 MR. JONES: No. This warrant is 
i 12 791008355. He has never been booked on this case. 
113 THE COURT: He has not been booked on 
J14 this case, then he needs to be booked on this case 
15 and released. 
116 MR. PETERSON: Unless you allow him to 
17 appear by summons. 
18 THE COURT: I am going to have him booked 
19 on it because on felony cases I believe he should be 
20 booked on felony cases. So he can be booked and 
21 released. 
22 MR. PETERSON: okay. Judge, I want to 
23 bring to your attention that what Mr. Jones said 
24 about the initial remittitur is correct, but I do 
25 need to make a record for appellate purposes. The 
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1 remittitur that came from the Utah Supreme Court was, 
2 in fact, recalled. The May 1997 remittitur was 
3 recalled by order and subsequently there was — 
4 THE COURT: When was it recalled? 
5 MR. PETERSON: It was recalled on June 
6 30th of'97. 
7 THE COURT: It was issued, the State 
8 filed and after they filed it was recalled; is that 
9 the correct actual scenario? 
10 MR. JONES: That's correct, Judge. 
11 THE COURT: I understand that. And it is 
12 properly filed (Inaudible). 
13 MR. JONES: Thanks, Judge. 
14 MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, what do you 
15 want to do procedurally in terms of the book and 
16 release process? When will you allow Mr. Norris to 
17 go and submit himself — 
18 THE COURT: I have (Inaudible) here that 
19 you can take him — 
20 MR. PETERSON: Well - but he has some 
21 affairs to take care of. I mean, he has made all 
22 appearances, Judge. 
23 THE COURT: (Inaudible) do it now and get 
24 it over with. 
25 MR. PETERSON: okay. May I have just one 
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1 moment? 
2 (Discussion off the record.) 
3 MR. PETERSON: Judge, the subsequent 
4 issue on that is if you are allowing booking him in 
5 this process, the warrant is $150,000. If you are 
6 saying that he has to be booked and then released, or 
7 that language needs to be stricken by your order and 
8 some sort of an interlineation from you. 
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THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. PETERSON: Thank you (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: You are welcome. 
We will be in recess. 
(Hearing adjourned.) 
BILLIE WAY, CCT 801-364-4943 Page 36 - Page 38 
Addendum C 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
ERNEST W.JONES, 1736 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801-363-7900 
FILED BIS IT COURT 
Third Judk ^'District 
APR 18 1999 
* - ^ 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-





Case No. 971008355FS 
The undersigned Ernest W. Jones, Deputy District Attorney, under oath states on 
information and belief that the defendant committed the crime of: 
COUNT I 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993^ in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Joan Mattson money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
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COUNT II 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Joan Mattson money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT III 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain Mike Mabry money or anything of value by means of false 
of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a 
party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for 
the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of the 
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT IV 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Mike Mabry money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
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COUNT V 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Utley money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT VI 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Utley money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT VII 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Chris Atkin money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
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COUNT VIII 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Chris Atkin money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT IX 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Joy Slotsvic money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT X 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Joy Slotsvic money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
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COUNT XI 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Sue Hunter money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT XII 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Sue Hunter money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
Officer Brook Plotnick, Officer Steve Humphrey, B. Gessel, Joan Mattson, Sue Hunter, 
Kay Crosby, Mike Mabry, L. Stauffer, Kay Utley, S. Francis, O. Fowler, K. Noland, D. 
Duffin and S. Labaron. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your affiant bases this Information on police report no. 94-25376 and the following: 
1. During the spring of 1993, the defendant ran an advertisment in the newspaper. 
The ad made certain promises and representations to those responding concerning employment 
and salary. Numerous people responded to the ad and met with the defendant. The defendant 
had each person sign an agreement with him. The defendant did not deliver as promised. The 
defendant then sued each person for over $1,000.00 and obtaine djudgments against many of 
these people. 
2. The defendant told several employees at his business that he never intended to 
fulfill any of the promises in the ad. The defendant back dated checks and altered records to 
cover up this scheme. 
I 
Authorized for presentment and filing: 
DAVID E. YOCOM, District Attorney 
^/£S>ISL^ Ovi-s^ 
Deputy District Attprney 
amended April 5,1999 
msw/97006614 
ERNESf W. JONES 
Affiant 
Subscribed and/^^gpttj 
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JACKSON, Presiding Judge: 
[^l Richard Norris appeals his sentence entered pursuant to 
conditional pleas of guilty to two counts of communications 
fraud, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-1801(1) (1995). 
BACKGROUND 
\2 Norris advertised employment positions, promising salaries 
and benefits for "diet counselors." Norris required the 
prospective "employees" to sign what they believed to be 
agreements regarding the custody of the diet product. Those 
agreements were in fact sales agreements wherein the "employees" 
turned out to be purchasers of the product, rather than employees 
entrusted with distributing the product. When the "employees" 
refused to pay, Norris then sued on those contracts. He was 
eventually charged with thirteen counts of communications fraud. 
1(3 Norris's trial counsel assured him that the trial date would 
be continued. However, on the date set for trial, the trial 
court denied Norris's motion to continue. Norris's counsel then 
\ 
urged him to plead guilty to two of the charges, rather than face 
conviction for all thirteen charges, pursuant to a plea bargain 
agreement offered by the prosecution before trial. Norris 
followed his attorney's advice, and pleaded guilty pursuant to 
State v. Serv, 758 P. 2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (allowing entry 
of guilty plea conditioned upon Defendant's preservation of right 
to appeal trial court's denial of suppression motion). He 
conditioned his pleas upon assurances by the court and the 
prosecution that certain issues would be preserved for appeal. 
The court specifically enumerated the issues that Norris would 
have the right to appeal once his guilty pleas were accepted and 
entered.1 That enumerated list included his claim of vindictive 
prosecution.2 The record indicates that 'Norris raised this issue 
several times through the course of the proceedings. Although 
the court had not ruled on Norris's vindictive prosecution claim, 
it promised him that he had a right to appeal it. In fact, the 
court stated "I would like to make a list of those motions that 
1. The court itemized the following issues as preserved for 
appeal: (1) the court's denial of Norris's motion to dismiss 
based on the statute of limitations; (2) the court's denial of 
Norris's motion to dismiss based on the expungement of the arrest 
records made in conjunction with the charges; (3) the court's 
denial of Norris's motion to remove his counsel for incompetency 
and conflict of interest; (4) the effective denial of Norris's 
speedy trial rights; (5) Norris's vindictive prosecution claim; 
(6) the State's failure to comply with discovery requests; (7) 
the constitutionality of Utah's communications fraud statute; and 
(8) inadequacy of the information. 
2. After the court enumerated the appealable issues, Norris 
struggled to identify more issues he hoped to preserve. The 
court apparently satisfied Norris's trepidation by promising 
Norris that "you're reserving the right to appeal any issue that 
the Court has heard and ruled on, but ruled adversely to you 
. . . you'd have a right to appeal that issue." The parties 
agreed in oral arguments that this was the most sweeping Serv 
plea they had seen. Although the breadth of the court's promises 
is not an issue before us, we note our concern that blanket 
preservation of issues for appeal may very well overflow the 
banks of what is allowable under Sery and its progeny. See State 
v. Serv, 758 P. 2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In Sery, we adopted 
the practice of accepting conditional guilty pleas because 
"forcing the parties to go through an entire trial merely to 
preserve the suppression issue is a pointless and wasteful 
exercise." Sery, 758 P. 2d at 939. Thus, conditional pleas serve 
the purpose of promoting judicial economy. The broad conditional 
pleas involved here, however, do not serve the ends of judicial 
economy. 
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you intend to reserve. You don't have to argue them. Just state 
your list of motions." It is axiomatic that a party has no right 
to appeal an issue unless the trial court has entered a final 
appealable order disposing of it. The trial court failed to rule 
on the vindictive prosecution issue, and all parties agree that 
it cannot be raised on appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 3(a) 
(requiring that judgment be final in order to appeal). 
1[4 Norris timely moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, alleging 
coercive circumstances in the inducement of those pleas. 
Primarily, he alleged that his counsel was unprepared for trial 
on the scheduled date. That lack of preparation, Norris alleged, 
pressured him into pleading guilty unexpectedly when he had 
expected the court to grant his motion to continue. He further 
alleged that the trial court's assurances led him to plead guilty 
in exchange for "non-existent benefits," rendering his pleas 
involuntary. The trial court orally denied NorrisTs motion to 
withdraw his guilty, pleas, but never entered a written order to 
that effect. Moreover, no signed minute entries appear in the 
record evidencing the trial court's disposal of the motion. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[^5 Although the court orally denied Norris's motion to withdraw 
his guilty pleas/ the State asserts that this court lacks 
jurisdiction to hear Norris's claims because it never entered a 
final order on the record. An appellate court's "determination 
of whether it has jurisdiction to hear an appeal is a question of 
law. Specifically, the jurisdictional question in this case is 
predicated upon whether an order is final and appealable, which 
is a question of law." Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 
6,1(18, 44 P.3d 663. 
Us Norris challenges the trial court's oral denial of his 
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. "We review a trial court's 
denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse of 
discretion standard, incorporating the clearly erroneous standard 
for the trial court's findings of fact made in conjunction with 
that decision." State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60,^10, 983 P.2d 556 
(quotations and citations omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
I- Jurisdiction 
1(7 "We first address the State's claim that this court lacks 
jurisdiction. The State argues defendant [cannot] appeal[] from 
unsigned minute entries" and that no written orders appear in the 
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record. State v. Smith, 776 P. 2d 929, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
The State asserts that the trial court's cral rulings do not 
constitute final orders for purposes of appeal. See State v. 
Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978) (» [T]he law is well 
settled in the state that the statements made by a trial judge 
are not the judgment of the case and it is only the signed 
judgment that prevails."). The State also correctly asserts that 
without a final order on the record, the court has no 
jurisdiction to hear an appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 3(a); see 
also Anderson v. Schwendiman, 764 P.2d 999, 1000 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988^ ) (holding notice of appeal filed after ruling has been 
announced, but before entry of order disposing of motion, is 
premature and does not confer jurisdiction on appellate courts). 
\8 "However, defendant actually appeals from the trial court's 
order of judgment and sentence which i_s a final appealable order, 
and not the unsigned minute entries." Smith, 776 P.2d at 931 
(emphasis added); see also Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887 (holding 
sentence constitutes a final judgment from which defendant has 
right to appeal). Where there is no final written order 
disposing of a motion, and no appeal could otherwise ensue, a 
judgment inconsistent with the motion can dispose of the motion 
by necessary implication for purposes of granting this court 
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kurth v. Wiarda, 1999 Utah App 153,1(8, 
981 P.2d 417 ("[T]he entry of the judgment on the verdict in 
light of the surrounding circumstances operates to effectively 
deny [the defendant's] motions by necessary implication."). 
Here, the trial court orally denied Norris's motion to withdraw 
his guilty pleas, but did not formally enter a written signed 
order. However, the court did nothing to alter its acceptance of 
Norris's guilty pleas and ultimately sentenced him. Thus, his 
sentence constitutes a final order from which he may appeal, and 
that sentence "effectively den[ies Norris's] motions by necessary 
implication." Id. Accordingly, the matter is properly before 
us. 
II. Norris's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas 
%9 The question before us is whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in refusing to grant Norris's motion to withdraw his 
guilty pleas after Norris presented an affidavit describing the 
alleged coercive circumstances surrounding his guilty pleas and 
waiver of rights. Norris argues that the court's erroneous 
assurances that he could appeal his vindictive prosecution claim 
rendered his conditional guilty pleas involuntary because they 
were given in exchange for "non-existent benefits." 
UlO State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988), controls our 
decision. In Copeland, the prosecution made promises in the plea 
agreement that Defendant could receive immediate sex-offender 
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treatment at an in-patient program at a hospital, rather than 
waiting for prison treatment three years before release from 
prison. See id. at 1267. The court ratified this suggestion 
without indicating to Defendant that by statute the court had no 
discretion in the choice of whether to place Defendant in 
hospital treatment or prison with later treatment. See id. at 
1268. The Utah Supreme Court held that such promises could 
easily induce someone to plead guilty, and that such inducements 
may render the plea involuntary if they mislead the defendant as 
to "the nature and value of any promises made to him." Id. at 
12 74. If a defendant pleads guilty "with an exaggerated belief 
in the benefits of his plea . . . he should be allowed to 
withdraw his plea." Id. at 1275 (quotations and citations 
omitted). Further, the "defendant must be allowed to withdraw 
his plea if the State made a promise it did not or could not 
fulfill." IcL. at 1276. 
Ull Both the trial court and the State clearly promised Norris 
that he could pursue a claim for vindictive prosecution on 
appeal, but neither the court nor the State could fulfill that 
promise. The court's legal error exaggerated the benefits Norris 
would receive from pleading guilty. Thus it misled Norris as to 
"the nature and value of [the] promise[] made to him." Id. at 
1274. 
fl2 We conclude "it is possible that defendant was genuinely and 
legitimately confused about" the value of these assurances 
compared with the seriousness of pleading guilty. Id. 
Accordingly, the court erred as a matter of law by promising 
Norris that he could appeal a vindictive prosecution claim. A 
discretionary ruling that compounds a previous harmful error of 
law constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Doty v. Cedar Hills, 
656 P.2d 993, 997 (Utah 1982). 
1fl3 Thus, Norris1 s pleas were not made voluntarily with full 
knowledge of the consequences of pleading guilty. Accordingly, 
Norris "must be allowed to withdraw his [guilty] pleats]." 
Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1276. We vacate the sentence and the 
1, the undersigned, Clerk of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, do hereby certify i^a the foregoing Is a 
full, true and correct copy o* an original document 
on file in the Utah Court of /voeals. In testimony 
whereof, I have set my hand a, id affixed the seal of 
the Court 
Paulette Sta^ 







guilty pleas and remand for proceedings consistent with this 
decision.3 




• t * 3 .-*-Ii>-light of this decision, we do not address Norris' s * >^ 
remaining challenges.





IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTWCTeCOUR^ru^ 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, S T A T E ^ F ^ f f j ^ L ^ l 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
~f2.i'c(/\ A-*-*! F. V^°*"*-\ 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA 
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
Case No. <\1l*e *?*? 
L H > ; c i ^ a r ^ r> N o r r i S , hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been 
advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights: 




I am pleading guilty (orlEi^ontestypo the following crimes 




Minimum Mandatory i A t ivimimum Mandator 
-%b - io - trot Ci) * 
±Jjj*c*> • **-
o 
TrL - \Q - 1201 C*) fr 
D. 
\si*4 
I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or 
had it read to me, an^J-^ff3c5staiB3\ the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am 
pleading, guilty (flfno contest). 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (orpo contest)/are: 
To k^ Q U - ^ I W ^ ^ rtw^.y" j£ l . o o ^ * J a 
I understand that by plp.ading-gmljy Iwill be admitting that I committed the crimes 
listed above. (Or, if I am pleadin^o-eorrtpt, I am not contesting that I committed the 
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleadmg no contest, I do not dispute or 
contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for 
which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty 
(ojiiiQrfeeniest) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or 
(no contest): _ ~ \ T \ 
AAoAJlt^J: <r«^r- Q- d^Lyrcr^l^oY^JLMh [J^KJiju^po^^^ /u. M L Sprite 
& I Oft? tuWVcL . IAA sJhs l/w \ * U &-£Cw* r-Cy r^Slu \a-\\&W & Cu^Q c;aj> Se4La&vd\\^ 
U>>4^_ "fcfoj^ ^ V - y , e v A j q L > V < O ^ . ^ - f k a - t ^ <;JAJ_ - fk jLrw ' , £ ^ 1 ^
 0fp>-fa.Y^ 
-V-v. 
Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights 
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead 
guilty (qrtio"contest) f)vill give up all the following rights: 
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I 
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand 
2 
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that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed 
lawyer's service to me. 
I (have not) (have) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to counsel, 
I have done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that 
I understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty 
(or no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the 
consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is S>£&*^ ^-* i N u u ^ J 
My attorney a M l k w e fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of 
my guilty (ofno cohte$) plea(s). 
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty fef^o^nTes^^ 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a 
trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and 
b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to 
cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me. 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a trial, I could call witnesses 
if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony 
of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would 
pay those costs. 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to 
have a trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose 
not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I also 
know that if I chose not to testify, the juiy would be told that they could not hold my refusal 
to testify against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty 
(orcng^contes^^)am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged 
crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my 
case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each 
3 
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element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict 
must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty (OT(TIQ^OOI^^^ give up the presumption of 
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or 
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the 
costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs foi^nejjin^rstand that I am giving up 
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (gfno co^itest)L^rimderstand that if I wish 
to appeal my sentence I must file a notice of appeal within 30 days after my sentence is 
entered. 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty
 31 am waiving and giving up all the 
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty ((or No Contest) PJfea 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each 
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no 
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving 
a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or 
both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be 
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my 
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of 
a plea agreement. 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime 
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run 
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each 
crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing 
on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no 
contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being 
imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was 
imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be 
inappropriate. 
4 
Plea agreement My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is/are) (is/are not) the result of 
a plea agreement between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and 
provisions of the plea agreement, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those 
explained below: * n 
Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges 
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not 
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they 
believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge. 
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, or unlawful 
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises 
except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I 
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to 
change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes 
because all of the statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
I am 45years of age. I have attended school through the / T grade. I can read 
and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been 
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drags, medication, or intoxicants which 
would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the 
influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental 
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing 
or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
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I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must 
file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I understand 
that for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea agreement must be 
made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest. I will only be allowed to withdraw 
my plea if I show that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. I understand that any 
challenge to my plea(s) made after sentencing must be pursued under the Post-
Conviction Remedies Act in Title 78, Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
Dated this r day of _ 5^p4<fv^,UgV- , 2 6£>?. 
DEFENDANT 
Certificate of Defense Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for ^Cck^-^A k)#rir If
 ? the defendant 
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have 
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its 
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, 
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of 
the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are 
accurate and true. 
TTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
Bar No. fakg^ 
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Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against 
f^icJ^e<^x,J2 AJ^r^'s , defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of 
Defendant and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which 
constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion 
to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained 
in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before 
the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the 
conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the 
acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public intei£ 
PROSECUCI^G ATTORNEY 
Bar No. Q ^0 O-^ 
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Order 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses 
the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely, 
knowingly, and voluntarily made. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the 
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered. 
Dated this ^ day of Ssp^e^itr
 ? 2 ^ 3 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Form revised 6/25/03 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
The parties agree to the following settlement terms and conditions in relation to State v. 
RichardNorris, case no. 971008355: 
1. Defendant will enter a plea of no contest to two counts of attempted 
communications fraud, a class a misdemeanor. The communications supporting the two 
counts are (1) the newspaper advertisement run in the spring of 1993; and (2) the in-person 
meeting with the victim(s) which culminated with the signing of agreements. The artifice 
devised to defraud the victims was to foil thertf ability to comply with contract agreements and 
then sue and obtain judgments against them. 
2. Defendant agrees to waive all appellate rights in relation to the case with the exception] 
of narrow issues of the constitutionality of the charging statute and jurisdictional issues 
previously raised with the Court and presently the subject of the appeal from judgment in the 
Fourth District Court case, which is presently on appeal. 
3. The State agrees that any restitution at issue be properly left to civil remedies, 
including the results of law suits previously filed in relation to the facts and circumstances of the 
present case. 
4. The State agrees that the proper sentence is to close the case with credit for time 
served considering that the defendant has already served more than the maximum period of 
incarceration allowed upon conviction for two class A misdemeanors. 
Addendum F 
SCOTT C. WILLIAMS (6687) 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
142 East 200 South, Suite 312 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 530-1541 
Facsimile: (801) 530-1549 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO DISMISS BASED UPON 
VINDICTIVE PROSECUTION 
Case No. 971008355 
: Judge: Honorable Robin Reese 
COMES NOW the defendant, Richard Norris, by and through his counsel Scott C. 
Williams, and hereby moves this court for an order dismissing the above referenced matter on the 
grounds that the prosecution has repeatedly "upped the ante" on Mr. Norris by filing superseding 
charging documents that repeatedly increased Mr. Norris' potential penalty whenever he exercised his 
constitutional and statutory rights to directly or indirectly challenge his case or raise legal issues. 
RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On December 20, 1994 West Valley City filed an information charging Mr. Norris with 
four misdemeanor counts of communications fraud. On February 5, 1996, Third Circuit Judge Watson 
dismissed the information, ruling that the misdemeanors must be consolidated into one felony count 
based upon value, and the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction over felony offenses. West Valley City 
1 
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appealed Judge Watson's ruling. However, on December 10, 1996 West Valley City moved to dismiss 
its appeal. Mr. Norris objected, seeking a ruling on the merits. 
On March 27, 1997 the State of Utah filed an information charging Mr. Norris with 10 
felony counts related to the same conduct alleged in connection with the misdemeanor prosecution. 
Mr. Norris moved to dismiss the case based on the fact that the appeal was still pending. His motion 
was granted on April 11, 1997. On November 19,1997 the District Court clarified that the April 11 
dismissal was without prejudice. 
On May 15, 1997 the State filed another Information based upon the same facts but 
increasing the number of felony counts to twenty. At a preliminary hearing on that information on 
February 3 and February 26, 1999 this Court dismissed 8 of the counts and bound defendant over for 
trial on the remaining 12 counts. An amended information related to the 12 counts was subsequently 
filed and remains the basis of the present prosecution. 
ARGUMENT 
The general factors implicated by a claim of vindictive prosecution by a defendant are 
best described in United States v. Burt. 619 F.2d 831 (9th C ir. 1980): 
The right to due process of law is violated where the government increases the severity of 
alleged charges in response to the exercise of constitutional or statutory rights. United 
States v. Rosales-Lopez, 617 F.2d 1349, 1357 (9th Cir. 1980); Unites States v. DeMarco, 
550 F.2d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 827, 98 S.Ct. 105, 54 L.Ed.2d 
85; see generally Blackledge v. Perry. 417 U.S. 21, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 
(1974); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). . . 
. Vindictive prosecution is generally found where the government has occasion to re-
indict or re-try a defendant after the exercise of a procedural right. [Citation omitted.]. . . 
. When a defendant attempts to have the charges dismissed based on an allegation of 
vindictive prosecution, then the defendant must make the initial showing of an 
"appearance of vincdictiveness." [Citations omitted.] In most cases, this involves a 
showing that the prosecutory has re-indicted the defendant and increased the severity of 
the charge, after the defendant has exercised a statutory or constitutional right. [Citations 
omitted.] The defendant does not have to demonstrate that the prosecution in fact acted 
i / 
with a malicious or retaliatory motive. [Citations omitted.] Instead, once the defendant 
has made this prima facie showing, then vindictiveness may be inferred. [Citations 
omitted.] 
In the present case, the government has formally charged Mr. Norris three separate times. 
In each re-charging, the government has upped the ante by significantly increasing the level and 
number of charges, and thus the potential penalty. Initially, in 1994, the government accused him of 
misdemeanor crimes. The Circuit court did not agree, and ruled that a single felony count should be 
filed in the District court. West Valley City appealed the ruling. When West Valley City later moved 
to dismiss the appeal, Mr. Norris objected, since having the appellate court validate Judge Watson's 
ruling would likely shape the issues in any future re-filing. 
As punishment for his exercising of his statutory and constitutional rights in the course of 
the misdemeanor and appellate proceedings, the government filed a felony case against Mr. Norris, 
charging not one count as was ordered by Judge Watson, but ten separate felony counts. However, the 
district court dismissed the 10 count Information because it had been improperly filed. Mr. Norris 
sought a dismissal with prejudice, which was ultimately denied. 
As punishment for continued defense of his case and exercising of his statutory and 
constitutional rights, the government filed another felony information doubling the number of felony 
charges to 20. Twelve of those survived preliminary hearing. (It is unclear why the present charging 
document charges Mr. Norris with two counts in relation to each of six alleged victims.) 
The history of this case represents a prima facie case of vindictive prosecution. Each 
time the government has re-charged Mr. Norris it has severely increased the number of charges and the 
potential penalty. All such filings follow a ruling by Judge Watson that a single felony count should 
have resulted from the conduct alleged in the first misdemeanor Information. The multiple instances 
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of "upping the ante" were seemingly motivated by frustration at Mr. Norris for repeatedly exercising 
his constitutional and statutory rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Mr. Norris respectfully requests that this Court enter an order 
dismissing the present case based upon a violation of his due process rights. Should this Court be 
disinclined to grant defendant's motion based upon the pleadings, he respectfully requests an 
evidentiary hearing prior to ruling on the merits. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ±_ day of April, 2003. 
TTC. WILLIAMS 
ttorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Dismiss was 
mailed to the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 via 




IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O0O' 
MAR 2 ? 1997 
FILED 
j
. ^ h Court of Appeals 
MR 2 6 1997 
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•" '-K of the Court 
West Valley City, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Richard Norris, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Case No. 960151-CA 
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Orme. 
This matter is before the court pursuant to West Valley 
City's motion to dismiss its appeal, to which defendant objects, 
and pursuant to defendant's motion to stay this court's February 
18, 1997 order, to which West Valley City objects. 
West Valley City seeks to dismiss its own appeal of the 
circuit court's order dismissing misdemeanor charges against 
defendant on the ground that the facts supported a felony charge, 
over which the circuit court did not have jurisdiction. 
Subsequently, the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office indicated 
its intent to file a felony charge in district court on the same 
facts. Since the circuit and district courts were consolidated 
in July, 1996, the district court now has jurisdiction whether 
the charges are filed as felonies or as misdemeanors. 
Defendant, through counsel, asserts that this appeal should 
not be dismissed because West Valley City will now file_JLglpny 
charges against h\m_out of vindictjveness fgx his filing of a 
motion to dismiss iiLcircuit courtr: However, even—assuming the 
truth of thes^aSBumptjjJil^V that issue is"~~riot' before this court 
and may be""raised in a different appeal, if and when defendant is 
convicted of felony charges. There is simply no reasoned 
argument that West Valley City should not be allowed to dismiss 
its own appeal from the circuit court's decision. 
Defendant's pro se argument that this court should stay its 
own order directing him to file a response to the motion to 
dismiss by March 3, 1997 is without merit. The trial court does 
not have jurisdiction to consider defendant's latest motion for 
substitute counsel, and defendant's claim that counsel will not 
adequately represent him does not appear to be supported by the 
filings in this court. 
I /_ 
Third Judicial District 
PEB 0 2 1999 
SALT UKE COUNTY 
MICHAEL A. PETERSON, #5130 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE 
Case No. 971005698FS 
JUDGE LEE A. DEVER 
After full briefing of the issues, oral argument by counsel 
and for good cause appearing; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's Motion to Dismiss with 
Prejudice in the above-entitled case is denied. 
DATED this day of February, 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE LEE A. DlWB^v^L^r* 
Third Digfrrict g^ ifx'E*1""'"' 
STAMP USEE OF JUDGE 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Order to Ernie Jones, 
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111, this day of February, 1999. 
DAVE) E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
GREGORY L. BOWN, 0402 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
JN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
RICHARD F. NORRIS, 
Defendant. 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS BASED UPON 
VINDICTIVE PROSECUTION 
Case No. 971008355 
Hon. Robin W. Reese 
GREGORY L. BOWN, Deputy District Attorney and Attorney for the State of Utah, 
responds to defendant's Motion to Dismiss Based Upon Vindictive Prosecution as follows: 
FACTS 
The State agrees that on December 20, 1994, the West Valley City Prosecutor had filed 
an information charging the defendant with four misdemeanor counts of Communication Fraud 
in case number 941004929. As indicated in the docket of that matter on February 5, 1996, Judge 
Watson stated "West Valley City vs Richard Norris is before the Court on a Motion to Strike the 
Initial Information as void on the basis it is lacking sufficient information to advise the defendant 
of persons alleged defrauded and the scheme or artifice utilized, precluding ability to prepare a 
defense. The Motion to Strike was filed subsequent to a defense request for a Bill of Particulars. 
The City Prosecutor filed an Amended Information. Thereafter, the defense filed a Motion to 
Quash the Amended Information alleging an invalid or void initial Information cannot be 
amended charging crimes now barred by the running of the Statute of Limitations. The Court 
received memorandums from both parties. In process of reviewing the voluminous paperwork 
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submitted by the city, the Court became concerned whether it was examining material that may 
never be admitted into evidence at the trial of the case and may require the Court to recuse itself 
for examining such investigative material. As it always does, in reviewing a case, the Court 
reviewed to confirm Jurisdiction of the Court. Statute 76-10-1801, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, 
under which the offenses are charged, indicates in subparagraph two (2) thereof, 'the 
determination of the degree of any offense under subsection (1) shall be measured by the total 
value of all property, money, or things obtained or sought to be obtained by the scheme or 
artifice described in subsection (1) . . . ' The initial information is silent as to the number of 
victims and measure of value. The Amended Information names four victims in four counts and 
measures value of more that $300 in each count. On January 4, 1996, the court sent letter to both 
parties, Mr David Maddox for the defendant and Mr Keith Stoney for the prosecution, requesting 
input in they desired, on the issue of jurisdiction. Response was received from the defense. 
None was received from the City for the Court's Review prior to making its decision the 5 day 
of February, 1996. In an attempt to resolve the issue of jurisdiction, the court reviewed some of 
the investigative material submitted by the City and determined the $1000 jurisdictional amount 
for Circuit Court jurisdiction had been exceeded. For example, a letter of demand from 
defendant Norris to a single victim of four alleged in the Information demands $1,6000. 
Therefore, the Court finds the Circuit Court lacks jurisdiction of the felonious actions alleged in 
the Amended Information. As a result, the Court does not reach the issue of striking the initial 
information for voidness or the issue to quash the Amended Information for running of the 
statute of limitations as raised by the defense." The State believes that Judge Watson did not rule 
that "the misdemeanors must be consolidated into one felony count based upon value: 
(Defendant Motion page 1) The State has no reason to disbelieve that, having appealed Judge 
m ?n 
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Watson's Order dismissing the matter, the West Valley City Prosecutor moved to dismiss its 
appeal, the defendant objected to the dismissal of the appeal, and the appeal continued. 
The State agrees that on M2^c\27jl9979 Former Prosecutor, Ernie Jones, of the Salt 
Lake County District Attorney's Office filed an information in case number 971005698 charging 
the defendant with 10 felony counts of Communication Fraud, each felonies, based not only 
upon the conduct of the defendant as represented by the conduct involved in the Judge Watson 
case and additional similar conduct involving additional victims which had been discovered 
subsequently to the filing of the misdemeanors by the West Valley City Prosecutors. The 
Remittitur on the Dismissal of the Appeal was not received until Mav 19,jl997. The defendant 
filed a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court shortly thereafter and the West Valley court did 
not receive a letter from the Supreme Court denying the defendant's Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari on September 30, 1997. The State agrees that on April 11, 1997, in case number 
971005698, Judge Lee Dever of this Court ordered ".. . that while this case in pending before the 
Court of Appeals and until that Court issues a Remittitur, this Court Js_prohibited from 
proceeding and therefore grantsDef^ (Docket case 
number 971005698, page 2) The defendant subsequently made a Motion to Dismiss With 
Prejudice, which was denied on December 4, 1998. 
The State agrees that on May 15, 1997, Mr. Jones filed another Information in case 
number 971008355 charging 20 counts of third degree felony Communications Fraud, alleging 
no further victims but alleging two "communications" under the Communications Fraud statute 
for each victim. 
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At the Preliminary Hearing on February 3 and 26, 1999, only 6 victims appeared and 
testified. Judge Palmer agreed that each victim had received two communications and bound the 
case over for trial on the essence of-the Amended Information now before this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
The defendant errs in his analysis of Vindictive Prosecution case law by arguing that an 
inference of vindictive prosecution allows a court to make a finding of vindictive prosecution. 
The defendant relies upon United State v. Burt, a decision from the Ninth Circuit, for this 
proposition. However, Burt is clear that an inference of vindictive prosecution creates a shift in 
the burden to the prosecution to rebut the inference. See Burt, 619 F.2d 831, 836 (9th Cir. 1980) 
("At this point, the burden then shifts to the prosecution to prove that the increase in the severity 
of the charges did not result from an vindictive motive"). 
The Tenth circuit Court of appeals applies a slightly more rigorous standard for the 
defendant who would argue vindictive prosecution. The Tenth Circuit has stated, "[a] defendant 
has the burden of proof and must establish either (1) actual vindictiveness, or (2) a realistic 
likelihood of vindictiveness which will give rise to a presumption of vindictiveness. Thereafter, 
the burden shifts to the prosecution to justify its decision with legitimate, articulable, objective 
reasons." United States v. P.H. R, 965 F.2d 848, 860 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. 
Raymer, 941 F.2d 1031, 1040 (10th Cir. 1991)). 
A few United States Supreme Court cases obliquely address the vindictive prosecution 
issue. In the instances where the Supreme Court found vindictive prosecution, it is important to 
note that the defendant had previously been convicted of misdemeanor charges and then when 
the defendant appealed the convictions, the prosecutor brought more serious, felony charges. 
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See generally Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27 (1984); and Blackledge v. Perry, All U.S. 21 
(1974). 
It is submitted that rather than as "punishment for his exercising of his statutory and 
constitutional rights in the course of the misdemeanor and appellate proceedings/' the State, 
through its designated representative, Mr. Jones, simply agreed wrthjhidg^ thatjthe^ 
conduct rose to the level of a felony offense. Upon an investigation, more victims were located 
and added as counts in the information. 
That information (971005698) was dismissed without prejudice because it was filed 
before the remittitur had been returned. When the case was refiled after all the appellate issues 
had been decided, it is apparent that the number of counts was doubled because each of the ten 
victims had received two communications from the defendant, the first was the advertisement in 
the newspaper and the second was at a meeting with the defendant. It is obvious that Judge 
Palmer agreed with the State's allegation with regard to two communications at the Preliminary 
Hearing. 
It is submitted that defendant's conjecture that the history of this case represents a prima 
facie case of vindictive is erroneous. It is submitted that the history and record of this case 
shows no reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness. It is submitted that what happened in this case 
was a defendant who tried^every method available to him to dela^the filing of felony charges 
which simply allowed the State to more adequately investiggtejiiscase, find more victims and 
better analyze the statute applying to th&Jracts of this defendant's conduct to charge the 
appropriate number of counts. " 
. — /""v -*k. 
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CONCLUSION 
There is no rule that the State is put in a stasis field upon the filing of any charges by any 
governmental agency and cannot continue to investigate the defendant's conduct. It is submitted 
that is exactly what happened in this case and no reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness is 
apparent or has been shown by the defendant. 
In the event that this court should find a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness, the State 
requests that this matter be set for an evidentiary hearing where the State can rebut such a 
finding. 
DATED this 9th day of April, 2003. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney 
GREGORY L. BOWN 
Deputy District Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing State's Response To 
Defendant's Motion To Dismiss Based Upon Vindictive Prosecution was delivered to Scott C. 
Williams, Attorney for Defendant Richard F. Norris, at 142 East 200 South, Suite 312, Salt Lake 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: State of Utah versus Richard Franklin 
Norris, Jr., who is present with his attorney, Mr. Williams. 
And I understand, Mr. Norris, that this hearing that 
was set today to schedule a hearing on your motion to dismiss, 
you would like continued and like that continued for about six 
weeks; is that correct? 
MR. NORRIS: Yes. 
THE COURT: And again, as every time we've done 
this, you're willing to acknowledge that the disposition of 
detainers that you had filed would be—this—this continuance 
would not be held against the State, that you're.requesting it 
willfully and the State is prepared to go forward on the 
motion, and that despite that fact, you're still interested in 
postponing that; is this correct? 
MR. NORRIS: Yes. 
THE COURT: You've done it voluntarily? 
MR. NORRIS: Yes. 
THE COURT: You don't feel you've been coerced by 
anybody to do this? 
MR. NORRIS: No. 
THE COURT: And the State doesn't object? 
MR. BOWN: That's correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: But you are prepared to go forward? 
1 
1" MR. BOWN: Yes. 
2 THE COURT: What about July the 29th at 2:00 
3 o'clock? 
4 MR. WILLIAMS: What we had talked about, your Honor, 
5 is, unfortunately, I'm unavailable until ths 28th to try to 
6 schedule with Mr. Norris a meeting at the Utah County Jail to-
7 -in relation to a box of documents that I'm going to have 
8 taken to him, hopefully tomorrow. And for that reason, if you 
9 could set it on August 11th, it will allow me two weeks 
10 between when I get back into town and August 11th to find the 
11 time to hopefully, adequately, consult with Mr. Norris. 
12 THE COURT: All right. August the 11th at 10:30. 
13 MR. BOWN: Is that a Monday? 
14 THE COURT: It is. 
15 That Will just be a scheduling conference. We'll 
16 note for the record the State's interest in going forward, but 
17 grant instead the defense motion to continue. 
18 And we'll see you back then. 
19 MR. WILLIAMS: And Judge, for the benefit of the 
20 record and Mr. Norris, in acknowledgement of the fact that 
21 your Honor had denied a prior motion to vacate the hold in 
22 this case, I will need to prepare an order for your signature 
23 to finalize that motion, if it had—if it wasn't final before. 
24 THE COURT: Okay. 
25 MR. WILLIAMS: And I'll prepare that and present it 
1 to the Court as soon as possible for your signature. 
2 THE COURT: All right. I'll sign it as soon as 
3 receive it. 
4 MR. WILLIAMS: Thank you. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. 
6 I (Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
7 
8 
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3 THE COURT: Yes, sir? 
4 MR. WILLIAMS: Judge, Richard Norris. 
5 THE COURT: I'll call that case next. 
6 State of Utah versus Richard Franklin Norris, Jr. 
7 Set today as a scheduling conference, I believe. 
8 MR. WILLIAMS: It is, Judge. I believe and I'm 
9 really optimistic that we711 be able to resolve this case. 
1Q I've talked to Mr. Bown about the specifics and I intend to 
11 put that, finalize it in—in a formal letter today, I hope, 
12 and get it to Mr. Bown, who will do some follow-up that he 
13 needs to do. And we think that the best thing to ask for is 
14 a—another hearing for disposition, change of plea on the 
15 25th. That gives us two weeks to—to make sure everything is 
16 finalized and in writing. 
17 MR. BOWN: That's correct, your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: All right. August the 25th, 10*30* 
19 MR. BOWN: Okay. Thank you. 
20 THE COURT: Uh huh. 
21 MR. WILLIAMS: Thank you, your Honor. 
22 (Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
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Clerk of the Court isobar! 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURTt Yes? 
MR, WILLIAMS: Good morning, your Honor. I have— 
THE COURT: Yes, 
MR* WILLIAMS: the Norris matter, 
THE COURT: I711 call that case. 
State of Utah versus Richard Franklin Norris. 
MR. BOWN: Greg Bown for the State. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Judge, Mr. Norris wasn't transported. 
THE COURT: Oh. 
MR. WILLIAMS: So, we just need to look at—we 
believe with some confidence, that the case is resolved. 
THE COURT: I see. 
MR. WILLIAMS: And, as a matter of fact, I spoke to-
-it did involve approaching your Honor. Again, we've done so 
in the past wheh Mr. Norris desires us to approach pursuant to 
Rule 11(H) at some point and see whether or not he'll indicate 
that he'll follow ;the resolution. It's a couple misdemeanors 
and closure of the cas£, because he's already served more time 
than what the—even consecutive sentences could garner him on 
these (inaudible) 
THE COURT: You—given what the Board of Pardons 
would do, you mean, if he'd been given consecutive sentences? 
2 
MR. WILLIAMS: Well, no, it's-— 
MR. BOWN: No. No* 
MR. WILLIAMS: The plea is to two A's. 
THE COURT: Oh, I see. 
MR. WILLIAMS: And he's done more than two years. 
THE COURT: Oh, I see. 
MR* WILLIAMS: That he— 
THE COURT: I see. 
MR* WILLIAMS: That he— 
MR. BOWN: Yeah, he's done more than two years, 
so. 
THE COURT: I see. 
MR. BOWN: And then it's not—the victims aren't 
looking for restitution anymore and there's civil matters, 
just civil suits that have pretty much resolved all that 
anyway. 
THE COURT: Well, I—I would approve it if the State 
recommends it, so... 
MR. WILLIAMS: So, we just need a date and I know 
that the 8th, Monday the 8th is the next Monday you have, but 
» 
I didn't know whether or not you had any desire to set it on a 
different setting. 
THE COURT: Yes. I probably would, Monday the 8th. 
Well, no, we can do it next Monday, that's fine. Or a week 
Monday, rather, Monday the 8th at 10:30. 
3 
All right. Monday, September the 8th, 10:30. 
MR. WILLiAMS: Thank you, Judge. That's all I have, 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
* * * 
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